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"The comments are not the law. " This conventional wisdom is
well known among Louisiana judges, scholars, practitioners, and law
students. Lawyers are instructed during the first days of law school
and on countless occasions thereafter that the comments,' appearing
just below the legislative text in statutory compilations, while useful,
are not to be taken too seriously. The familiar maxim resounds from
the pages of judicial opinions2 and scholarly writing.3 Never mind
1.
Throughout this Article, the terms "comments," "legislative comments,"
"revision comments," "reporter's comments," and "official comments" will be used
interchangeably, as is the custom of courts and scholars. Although courts refer to comments
occasionally as "commentary," this Article avoids that terminology in reference to the
legislative comments given that, in the civil law tradition, the term "commentary" is used to

refer broadly to the writings of legal scholars.

The author's observations about, and

criticisms of, legislative comments are not intended to be extrapolated to all scholarly
writing.

2.

See, e.g., Sims v. Am. Ins. Co., 2012-C-0204, p. 6 (La. 10/16/12); 101 So. 3d 1, 5

("Moreover, comments to Civil Code articles do not constitute law."); Broussard v. Hilcorp

Energy Co., 2009-C-0449, p. 5 n.5 (La. 10/20/09); 24 So. 3d 813, 816 n.5 ("[S]tatements
contained in the official comments are not part of the statute and are not binding on courts
.... ); Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So. 2d 811, 813 (La. 1991) ("[Comments] have
no legislative effect on the statute because they are not part of the law."); Lakewood Prop.

Owners' Ass'n v. Smith, 2014-CA-1376, p. 23 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/15); 183 So. 3d 780,
794 ("We note, however, that comments to Civil Code articles do not constitute law."); see
also, e.g., Cent. Props. v. Fairway Gardenhomes, LLC, 2016-C-1855, p. 11 (La. 6/27/17);

2017 WL 2837152, at *6 ("Although the Official Revision Comments connected with
statutes are not the law, they can be useful in determining legislative intent."); Tracie F. v.

Francisco D., 2015-CJ-1812, p. 8 (La. 3/15/16); 188 So. 3d 231, 238 ("While the Official
Revision Comments are not the law, they may be helpful in determining legislative intent.");

Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 2004-C-0968, p. 11 (La. 1/19/05); 893 So.
2d 789, 797 ("[W]e note that statements contained in the official comments are not part of the
statute, and are not binding on this court, although we do not discount them entirely.").
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that the comments are routinely passed before the legislature within
the bills that are ultimately enacted into law,4 or that courts refer to
these annotations as the "official comments" to the legislation.5 Do
not be distracted by courts' frequent, detailed discussions of the
comments, nor by their slavish dependence upon them. 6 Legislative
comments are mere doctrine,7 written by scholars and designed only
to provide context for legislative reforms. They are not law.
However, while legislative comments are not law in an official
sense, comments have far more significance and influence than the
conventional wisdom dares to admit. Comments add an immense
volume of substance to the law. They provide a vast network of rules,
policies, and historical cross-references that supports, enhances, and
at times even contradicts the legislative text.8 Though traditionally
regarded as doctrine-the expository writings of legal scholars-this
vital infrastructure enjoys an elevated status unknown by other forms
of scholarship: they are endorsed by the legislature and directly
inform legislative intent.9 Further, even while not law, comments are
cited and recited and parsed by courts and, ultimately, relied upon to
reach outcomes in legal disputes.o Their authority should not be

underestimated.
Judicial reliance on nonbinding authorities is not necessarily
objectionable; after all, both doctrine (scholarly writing) and
3.
See, e.g., P. RAYMOND LAMONICA & JERRY G. JONES, 20 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE: LEGISLATIVE LAW & PROCEDURE § 7.7 (2d ed. 2016) (noting that in the conduct of
statutory interpretation, "[t]he court may also examine text included in statutes and codes
such as Official Revision Comments, section headings, and the classification and
organization of sections, but must keep in mind that such text is not part of the law"); A.N.
YLANNOPOULOs, 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: PROPERTY § 7.40 (5th ed. 2015)
("Indeed, the Revision Comments are not law."); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Forced Heirship
Changes: The Regrettable "Revolution" Completed, 57 LA. L. REv. 55, 92-93 (1996)
("Furthermore, comments are not the law."); Symeon Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes
to the New Law of Possession and Acquisitive Prescription, 44 LA. L. REv. 69, 139 n.109
(1983) ("[C]omments are not part of the law.").
4.
See discussion infra Part m.A.1. As is discussed infra, comments have been
included routinely in Law Institute bills since the 1940s.
5.
See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
6.
See discussion infra Part HI.A.2.
7.

AN. YIANNOPOuLOS, CIvIL LAW SYSTEM: LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIvE LAW

165-66 (2d ed. 1999) ("The word doctrine signifies the body of opinions on legal matters
expressed in books and articles. The word is also used to designate, collectively, the persons
learned in the law who are engaged in analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of legal materials.
It thus refers both to legal scholarship and the persons who devote their time to scholarly
elaboration on texts.").
8.
See discussion infra Part I.B.
9.
See discussion infra Part m.A.1.
10. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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jurisprudence (judicial decisions) are highly regarded as influential,
though secondary, sources of law.11 However, unlike jurisprudence,
whose role and status as a source of law in Louisiana is continually
discussed and debated,12 the comments have acquired their force
without any meaningful scrutiny of the process of their drafting, their
role in the development of legal rules and norms, or their impact on
legal disputes. As a result, they have evolved into a source of lawl3
that, while substantial in volume and authority, largely remains hidden
from view.
The time has come for the comments to be taken more seriously,
and for meaningful inquiry to be made into their role and status as a
source of law.14
11.

See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 cmt. b (2017) (recognizing the secondary status of

doctrine and jurisprudence); Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 2000-0947, pp. 13-15 (La. 12/19/00);
774 So. 2d 119, 128-29 (addressing the secondary status ofjurisprudence).
12.
For examples of the debate about the role jurisprudence in Louisiana, see
generally Gordon Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 11 TUL. L. REV. 585
(1937) (concluding that Louisiana is a common law jurisdiction, in part due to reliance on
precedent); Harriet Spiller Daggett et al., A ReappraisalAppraised: A Brieffor the Civil Law
ofLouisiana, 12 TUL. L. REv. 12 (1937) (arguing that Louisiana courts rely on precedent no
more than other civil law jurisdictions); Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources ofLaw and the
Value ofPrecedent: A Comparativeand EmpiricalStudy ofa Civil Law State in a Common
Law Nation, 65 LA. L. REV. 775, 781 (2005) (concluding that Louisiana courts exercise a
"systemic respect for jurisprudence"); Jason Edwin Dunahoe, Note, "Jurisprudence
Disoriente:" The LouisianaSupreme Court's Theory ofJurisprudentialValuation, Doerr v.

Mobil Oil and Louisiana Electorate of Gays and Lesbians v. State, 64 LA. L. REv. 679 (2004)
(calling upon the Louisiana Supreme Court to clarify its theory of judicial precedential
valuation); Mary Garvey Algero, Considering Precedent in Louisiana: Balancing the Value
ofPredictableand Certain Interpretationwith the Tradition ofFlexibility and Adaptability,
58 Loy. L. REv. 113 (2012) (suggesting that Louisiana courts strike an appropriate balance
between predictability and flexibility when it comes to jurisprudence); Charles J. Stiegler,
The PrecedentialEffect of UnpublishedJudicialOpinions Under Louisiana Law, 59 LOY. L.
REV. 535 (2013) (exploring weight given to unpublished opinions); FRANK L. MARAIST, lA
LOuIsiANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: CIVIL PROCEDURE-SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS § 4.1 (2015)
(arguing that judicial decisions are the law until overruled by the Louisiana Supreme Court or

the legislature).
13.
As will be made clear in the pages that follow, this Article does not suggest that
the comments are a source of law de jure, that is, in the strict dogmatic sense of the phrase.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 ("The sources of law are legislation and custom."); id. cmt. b
("According to civilian doctrine, legislation and custom are authoritative or primary sources
of law. They are contrasted with persuasive or secondary sources of law, such as
jurisprudence, doctrine, conventional usages, and equity. . . ."). Nevertheless, for the reasons
expressed herein, the comments are most certainly a source of law de facto, that is, a
wellspring of rules and norms that are regarded as highly authoritative, although not binding.
14.
As a member of the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute and the reporter
of two Law Institute committees, both of which have produced draft legislation complete
with comments, I undertake this inquiry in the spirit of improving the processes for and the
product of law reform initiatives. I do not intend to disparage the Law Institute or its
members, nor to denigrate that institution's many successes.
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This Article explores the process by which comments are made,
the manner in which they are employed by courts, and their
relationship to the legislative texts. 15 This examination reveals that the
comments are indeed a significant source of law-even if not law in a
formal sense, the comments play an indispensable role in the
application and development of law. The historical, doctrinal, and
jurisprudential context provided by the comments is essential to the
process of law reform in this state, as well as to the ultimate
acceptance and understanding of the law. Indeed, most practitioners
would find it unthinkable to navigate the law without their guidance.
However, the comments come at a cost: the drafting and publication
of legislative comments conflicts, at least in some measure, with our
commitments to codification in the civilian style, the democratic
legitimacy of legislation, and the transparency and accessibility of
law.16 Moreover, while the cost of the comments has long been
justified by their practical utility, our neglect of the comments has
resulted in errors, inconsistencies, and anachronisms, all of which
undermine their efficacy as guideposts for both the bench and the
bar.17 Perhaps worse, we have failed to consider the extent to which
our reliance on the comments may impede the clarity and precision of
legislation at the time that it is drafted, as well as the organic
development of the law through its application by courts.18
These observations, taken together, make clear that if the
comments are not taken more seriously, and soon, the result may be
the unwitting degradation of our law.
Shining a light on the
comments and the manner of their making may reveal some unsightly
warts, but it should also motivate a frank discussion about the ways in
which comments, and in turn the law, can be improved. What is more,
Louisiana is not unique in its use of legislative comments-comments
and commentary accompany many legislative texts, uniform laws, and
model rules found in civil law and common law jurisdictions alike.19
15.

See discussion infra Parts II & III.

16.
17.

See discussion infra Part W.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.

18.

See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.

19.
See generally, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. (containing "advisory committee notes");
CODIGO C1VIL [COD. CIVIL] [CIv. CODE] (J. Lajoune & Cia. eds., 1939) (Arg.) (containing
"notas"); U.C.C. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014) (containing "official
comments"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016)
(containing "commentary"); UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INT'L

SALE OF GOODS (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law 2010) (accompanied by an "explanatory
note"); PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (COMM'N ON EuR. CONTRACT LAW 2003)

(containing "comments"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW. INST. 1981)
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Thus, an examination of Louisiana's experience with comments will
serve as an important contribution to the discourse surrounding the
drafting, use, and revision of the comments of those various
compilations.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes the drafting,
publication, and revision of legislative comments. Part I11 explores
the status of the comments as a source of law and examines the ways
in which comments interact with the legislative text. Part IV advances
theoretical and functional critiques of the comments. Finally, Part V
presents initial suggestions for improving the drafting, publication,
and revision of the comments and calls upon all parties involved in
the making and study of Louisiana law to continue to debate the role
and status of this hidden source of law.
II.

THE DRAFTING AND PROMULGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
COMMENTS

Although judges and lawyers frequently rely upon the comments
for guidance in the resolution of legal disputes, few members of the
bench and bar are fully versed in the manner of their making. The
following subpart provides an overview of the history and
methodology of the comments.
A.

A BriefHistory of the Legislative Comments

The drafting and promulgation of legislative comments is a
rather new phenomenon in Louisiana-with one exception, the
practice dates to the establishment of the Louisiana State Law
Institute (Law Institute) in 1938.20 Prior to that time, the only
(containing "comments");

MISTERE DE LA JUSTICE, COMMENTAIRES DU MINISTRE DE LA
JUSTICE: LE CODE CIVIL DU QUEBEC (Publications du Quebec ed., 1993) (containing

"commentaire").
20. The Law Institute is Louisiana's official law revision commission, law reform
agency, and legal research agency. LA. REv. STAT. § 24:201 (2017) (enacted by Act No. 166,
1938 La. Acts 429); see generally William E. Crawford & Cordell H. Haymon, Louisiana
State Law Institute Recognizes 70-Year Milestone: Origin, History and Accomplishments, 56

LA. B.J. 85 (2008) (detailing the history and work of the Law Institute); William E.
Crawford, The Louisiana State Law Institute-Historyand Progress, 45 LA. L. REv. 1077

(1985) (describing the organization and process of the Law Institute). The Law Institute's
legislative mandate is broad; among its principal functions are the responsibilities to
"consider needed improvements in both substantive and adjective law and to make
recommendations concerning the same to the legislature," to "examine and study the civil
law of Louisiana and the Louisiana jurisprudence and statutes of the state with a view of
discovering defects and inequities and of recommending needed reforms," to "recommend
from time to time such changes in the law as it deems necessary to modify or eliminate
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occasion on which "comments" were drafted to accompany legislation
was the preparation of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. Although
the drafters of the 1825 Civil Code prepared extensive comments to
accompany the projet, or draft, that was submitted to the legislature
for its approval, the comments were not promulgated alongside the
law once it was enacted. 21 Since its inception, however, the Law
Institute has recommended hundreds of bills to the legislature,22 many
of which have contained legislative comments, and those comments
have all been published in official compilations of the law.23 The
drafting of comments is thus an integral component of the Law
Institute's law reform work.
Indeed, the Law Institute's very first reform initiative, the 1942
revision of the Louisiana Criminal Code, involved the preparation of
extensive comments designed to explain the proposed changes.24 The
antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and to bring the law of the state, both civil and
criminal, into harmony with modem conditions." LA. REV. STAT. §24:204(A)(l)-(2), (5).
The Law Institute has also been granted "continuous revision" authority, according to which
the law revision commission is authorized to "direct and supervise the continuous revision,
clarification and co-ordination" of Louisiana law. Id. §24:251. Stated simply, the Law
Institute's principal charge is to study the law, make recommendations for its reform, and
oversee its printing and coordination. See generally id. §24:204(A)(l)-(10) (providing a
comprehensive list of the Law Institute's duties).
21. A Republication of the Projet of the Civil Code of Louisiana of 1825, in 1
LOuISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES (1937).

22.

See generally Crawford & Haymon, supra note 20 (cataloging the major

legislative proposals of the Law Institute through early 2006); LA. STATE LAW INST., THE

(2016) (listing all
legislation proposed between 2000 and 2016).
23. For example, among the 163 Law Institute bills described in the Thirty-Ninth
Biennial Report of the Law Institute, only fifty-two did not contain commentary. The
instances in which legislation was proposed without comments tend to involve targeted
revisions of one or more provisions rather than systemic reforms. See, e.g., Act No. 415, 2005
La. Acts 2039 (enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:2801(C), relative to attorney
fees in partitions of community property); Act No. 1295, 2003 La. Acts 3897 (revising
Criminal Code provisions dealing with child pornography, obscenity, and video voyeurism);
Act No. 509, 2001 La. Acts 1084 (revising Civil Code article 395). One notable exception is
the revision of the law of registry, which, although substantial, was made without comments.
See Act No. 169, 2005 La. Acts 1383; infra notes 116-117 and accompanying text. Also, bills
that merely repeal or transfer and redesignate law, without enacting new provisions or
amending existing ones, do not contain comments. See, e.g., Act No. 503, 1999 La. Acts 1714
(repealing definitional provisions); Act No. 705, 1990 La. Acts 1535 (repealing provisions
relating to master and servant); Act No. 126, 1987 La. Acts 418 (repealing and redesignating
provisions relating to corporations, unauthorized corporations, and unincorporated
associations). Bills updating terminology likewise do not contain comments. See, e.g., Act
No. 26, 2004 La. Acts 936 (eliminating "illegitimate children" and related terms).
24. See Act No. 43, 1942 La. Acts 137; see also Dale E. Bennett, The Louisiana
Criminal Code: A Comparison with PriorLouisiana Criminal Law, 5 LA. L. REv. 6, 49
(1942) (extolling the virtues of the new Criminal Code in its inclusion of comments).
THIRTY-NINTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE
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preparation of the Louisiana Criminal Code was a monumental task
that involved the complete codification of a previous hybrid system of
partially written and partially jurisprudential criminal rules. 25
Although the aim of codification was not a complete overhaul of the
law or a break from the past, the Law Institute was charged with
synthesizing and modernizing the law in the character of a true "code"
in the civilian sense. 26 The principal drafters of the Criminal Code
viewed the preparation of comments as critical to the acceptance of
the projet's synthesized and modernized rules by the Law Institute
and, ultimately, the legislature.27 Specifically, the comments allowed
the drafters to explain the relationship between the new legislation and
the old and to describe the intended scope and meaning of the text.28
Once complete, the projet, including explanatory comments, was
presented to the legislature for consideration and adoption.29 The
inclusion of comments proved successful; the projet was ultimately
approved by the legislature, and thus Louisiana's modern Criminal
Code was born. 30 Indeed, the legislature was so impressed with the
quality of the comments and their potential utility for lawyers and
judges that it passed a concurrent resolution in the same session
directing the publication of the comments alongside the text of the law
and declaring that "the information contained in the 'Comments' on
each proposed article is of inestimable value and will be an important
and useful source of information for all persons using [the] Code."31
The publication of the comments was praised by Professor Dale
Bennett, one of the three principal drafters of the Criminal Code, for
its potential to "greatly facilitate an adjustment to the new law."32 On

25.

See Bennett, supra note 24, at 6.

26.

See id.

27.

See Clarence J. Morrow, The 1942 Louisiana Criminal Code in 1945: A Small

Voice from the Past, 19 TUL. L. REv. 483, 498 (1945).
28. See Bennett, supra note 24, at 49.
29
S. Con. Res. 12, 1942 Leg., 11th Reg. Sess. (La. 1942) (noting that the projet was
submitted in bill form).
30. Act No. 43, 1942 La. Acts 137.
31. S. Con. Res. 12 (emphasis omitted). In addition, in Act 7 of 1940, the legislation
instructing the Law Institute to prepare a projet of a criminal code, the legislature directed
that the projet "together with an explanatory statement and notes shall be printed and
[submitted] to the Governor" by April of 1942. Act No. 7, 1940 La. Acts 12. Thus, it
appears as though the preparation of commentary was anticipated from the earliest stages of
the revision effort.
32. See Bennett, supra note 24, at 49. Professor Harriet Daggett also remarked in her
writing that it was "particularly worthy of mention that the explanatory notes and comments
were included in the official edition for guidance in interpretation of the letter and spirit of the
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the other hand, another member of the trio, Professor Clarence
Morrow, lamented that the comments were published in their original
form rather than refashioned into an exposd des motifs, or scholarly
narrative expounding upon the motives for and effect of the revised
law.33 In his reflections on the final product of his labors, he mused:
Even where a break with the past was intended, it was necessary to
relate the code article to the past for the benefit of countless advisers,
committeemen, and Law Institute Council members. Each new article
had to be explained in the Comment in terms of the past in order to
make the Code acceptable. This in itself was not objectionable, and was
undertaken willingly enough, but after the Code was passed, a revision
of the Comments should have been undertaken which would have
emphasized the intended new meaning of the articles rather than so
frequently stressing historical ties with the pre-existing concepts. There
was simply no time for this, and it was far better to print the Comments
in their present form than not to print them at all. Nevertheless, the
Comments, as presently constituted, do not exactly represent the
carefully prepared civilian motifs contemplated by the writer as a
necessary integral part of a modem code system.34
Thus, it appears that Morrow was torn-while he recognized the
comments' enormous value, he worried that their publication impeded
the objective of preparing a code in the "civilian" style. 35
The next law reform initiative of the Law Institute was the
comprehensive revision of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,
completed in 1960.36 Like the Criminal Code before it, the Code of
Civil Procedure was prepared with extensive accompanying
comments. 37 And, like the drafter's comments of the Criminal Code,
the reporter's comments of the Code of Civil Procedure were
presented to the legislature in bill form and published alongside the
new code." Harriet S. Daggett, The Louisiana State Law Institute, 22 TEX. L. REV. 29, 33
(1944).
Morrow, supra note 27, at 498.
33.

34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See Crawford & Haymon, supra note 20, at 91. Prior to the revision of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the Law Institute undertook the enormous task of compiling the Revised
Statutes of 1950. While this was an extraordinarily significant project, it did not involve law
reform in the sense of substantive revisions of the law; instead, the project involved the
compilation, systematization, and clarification of statutes that had been enacted by the
legislature since the promulgation of the Civil Code of 1870. See Dale E. Bennett, Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1950, 11 LA. L. REv. 4, 4-5 (1950); Melissa T. Lonegrass, The
Anomalous Interaction Between Code and Statute-Lessor's Warranty and Statutory
Waiver, 88 TUL. L. REv. 423, 434-40 (2014).
37. Act No. 15, 1960 La. Acts 22.
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text of the law once it was enacted.38 In the resolution authorizing the
Code's publication, the legislature remarked that it would be
"convenient and helpful" if all introductions, preliminary statements,
and comments prepared by the Law Institute were printed in the
official edition, stating that the comments in particular would "prove
invaluable in the future to legislators, judges, state officials, and
lawyers in the application of these procedural rules, and the
construction and interpretation of the language of the various articles
of the proposed code." 39 Notably, however, the legislature directed
that the comments be printed in a smaller type than that used for the
printing of the articles.40 As one scholar later surmised, this was
likely done in order to signify that the comments were of "lesser
importance" than the text.41
As was the case when the Criminal Code was enacted, the
publication of the comments prepared in connection with the Code of
Civil Procedure was somewhat controversial. One of the drafters,
Professor Henry McMahon, acknowledged the "departure from
traditional civilian redaction [drafting] techniques," and commented
that the publication of the comments was accomplished "over the
objections of a few of the old-school civilians."42 McMahon
explained that the publication of the comments accompanying the
Louisiana Criminal Code had inspired the decision to again deviate
from accepted civilian drafting procedures. He noted that the
"experiment" had "proved so helpful to the courts and lawyers of the
state that there was a strong professional demand for the employment
of this technique in the projet of the new procedural code."43
Moreover, McMahon explained, the preparation of comments was
justified by the importance placed on judicial precedent by Louisiana
judges and jurists.44 The comments were thus viewed as necessary to

38. H.R. Con. Res. 3, 1960 Leg., 23rd Reg. Sess. (La. 1960).
39. Id.
40. Id. The legislature also directed that the comments to the Trust Code be printed
in "smaller type." H.R. Con. Res. 28, 1964 Leg., 27th Reg. Sess. (La. 1964). The resolution
authorizing the publication of the comments to the Criminal Code provided that they should
be published "as footnotes." S. Con. Res. 12, 1942 Leg., 11th Reg. Sess. (La. 1942).
41. Fred Zengel, Civil Code Revision in Louisiana, 54 TUL. L. REV. 942, 959 (1980).
42. Henry G. McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 1,
18(1960).
43. Id. at 18-19.
44. Id. at 19.
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point out those judicial opinions whose rules were either consistent
with or overruled by the new legislation.45
The stories of the drafting and publication of the comments to
the Criminal Code and the Code of Civil Procedure are revealing.
Together, they illustrate that comments have long been viewed by
those involved in law reform as indispensable, not only to the
legislative process but to the ultimate acceptance and understanding
of the revised law. While the drafters perceived that the publication of
revision comments diverged from traditional civil law principles of
codification, the methodological concerns were ultimately
outweighed by the practical. Prior to codification, Louisiana's
criminal law and procedural law were heavily jurisprudential; thus, an
explanation of the relationship between precedent and codified law
was essential. Also, it is noteworthy that in directing the publication
of the comments, the legislature never made any reference to the
notion that the comments are not law.46 Presumably, no one thought
that such an admonition was necessary in those early days of
legislative comments.
Comments were later prepared, presented to the legislature, and
published in connection with the 1964 revision of the Trust Code,47
the 1966 revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 48 and the 1974
enactment of the Mineral Code. 49 When the Law Institute
commenced its comprehensive revision of the Civil Code in 1976,
which began with the revision of the Civil Code title governing
usufruct, use, and habitation (personal servitudes), 50 extensive
legislative comments were included in the bill along with the
proposed legislation.51 As had become the custom, the comments
were prepared by the reporter and principal draftsman, Professor A.N.
45.
See id. ("Judicial precedent plays a more important role in Louisiana than in any
other civilian jurisdiction, and the consideration of the prior jurisprudence was deemed
helpful in all cases. The citation of prior cases was absolutely necessary in those instances

where the jurisprudential rule was being reversed legislatively.").
46. See, e.g., Act No. 15, 1960 La. Acts 22; H.R. Con. Res. 3, 1960 Leg., 23rd Reg.
Sess. (La. 1960); Act No. 43, 1942 La. Acts 137; S. Con. Res. 12, 1942 Leg., 11th Reg. Sess.
(La. 1942); Act No. 7, 1940 La. Acts 12.
47.
See Act No. 338, 1964 La. Acts 711; H.R. Con. Res. 28, 1964 Leg., 27th Reg.
Sess. (La. 1964).
48. See Act No. 310, 1966 La. Acts 620; H.R. Con. Res. 10, 1966 Leg., 29th Reg.
Sess. (La. 1966).
49. See Act No. 50, 1974 La. Acts 237; S. Con. Res. 2, 1974 Leg., 37th Reg. Sess.
(La. 1974).
50. See Crawford & Haymon, supra note 20, at 89.
51. See Act No. 103, 1976 La. Acts 321.
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Yiannopoulos.52 And, as in the past, when the legislation was enacted,
the reporter's comments were published alongside the text. 53 The
printing of comments had become an accepted practice by this time.
Although scholars, including Yiannopoulos, later criticized the
inclusion of comments in the legislation revising the Civil Code,54
there appears to have been no serious controversy surrounding the
decision to publish the comments that had been prepared.
The preparation of comments has become, through repetition,
one of the chief responsibilities of the Law Institute's many reporters.
Since 1976, comments have been drafted to accompany almost every
major Law Institute proposal enacting or amending legislation,
including the extensive and continuing revisions of the Civil Code,5 5
the reform of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, 56 the adoption of
nearly all of the Uniform Commercial Code,57 and the enactment and
revision of numerous provisions of the Louisiana Revised Statutes."5
While the vast majority of comments penned by the Law Institute
accompany legislation that it prepared, the agency is occasionally
asked to draft comments for bills that it did not assist in preparing.
59
This was the case, for example, with the Louisiana Children's Code
A lengthy introductory expos6 des motifs, also prepared by Professor
52.
Yiannopoulos, was included in the bill as well. Id.; see also Crawford & Haymon, supra
note 20, app. F (documenting that Yiannopoulos was the reporter for the revision of the Civil
Code title relating to personal servitudes); Cynthia Ann Samuel, The 1997 Succession and
Donations Revision-A Critiquein Honor ofA.N. Yiannopoulos, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1041, 1042
(1999) (noting that "to accompany the submission of the revision to the legislature
[Yiannopoulos] wrote an 'Expos6 des Motifs' carefully documenting the differences between

the present and the proposed law").
53.

(1977)

Compare Act No. 103, 1976 La. Acts 321, with LA. CIV. CODE arts. 533-645

(demonstrating that the comments

were published alongside the articles).

Remarkably, this was done although the legislature never directly authorized their publication
in the enacting legislation or any accompanying resolution.
54.
See, e.g., A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative
Essay, 78 TuL. L. REV. 379, 406 (2003); Zengel, supra note 41, at 961.

55. See, e.g., Act No. 821, 2004 La. Acts 2556 (revising Book Ill, Title IX, Lease);
Act No. 841, 1993 La. Acts 2239 (revising Book Ell, Title V1I, Of Sale); Act No. 923, 1991
La. Acts 2747 (enacting Book IV, Conflict of Laws); Act No. 886, 1987 La. Acts 2409
(revising Book I, Title IV, Husband and Wife); Act No. 331, 1984 La. Acts 718 (revising
Book En, Titles I & IV, Obligations in General and Conventional Obligations or Contracts);

Act No. 728, 1978 La. Acts 1900 (revising Book II, Title I, Things). There is one notable
exception: the 2005 revision of the law of registry. See Act No. 169, 2005 La. Acts 1383; see
also infra notes 116-117 and accompanying text (discussing the revision's lack of
comments). The reason for this omission has not been documented.

56.
57.
58.
134, 2014
59.

See Act No. 515, 1988 La. Acts 1085.
See Act No. 128, 2001 La. Acts 206.
See, e.g., Act No. 724, 1981 La. Acts 1400 (regarding private works); Act No.
La. Acts 1422 (regarding child support).
Act No. 235 § 20, 1991 La. Acts 706, 1059.
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and the Louisiana Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,60 as well as
several other less extensive enactments. 61 Taken together, these many
sets of comments represent the Law Institute's most substantial
doctrinal contribution to the state's legal system.
The story of the comments' origin and history must include one
final detail: on rare occasions, comments have been drafted by groups
other than the Law Institute.62 In each case, those comments were
eventually replaced with others prepared by the state law reform
agency. One interesting case involved the comments to the 1984
legislation that recodified Louisiana's banking law.63 That legislation
was prepared by the Louisiana Bankers Association, which also
presented to the House Commerce Committee various explanatory
materials, including an expos6 des motifs, source provisions, and
revision comments.64 Apparently several legislators were less than
comfortable including in the bill comments and explanatory materials
drafted by a body other than the Law Institute, and, as a result, the bill
as introduced and enacted omitted all such material.65 In the same
session, the legislature passed a separate resolution requesting that the
Law Institute review the Louisiana Bankers Association's supporting
Act No. 244 § 2, 2001 La. Acts 587, 598.
61. See, e.g., Act No. 190 §2, 2010 La. Acts 1405, 1405 (requesting that the Law
Institute draft comments corresponding to the revision of Children's Code article 1243); Act
No. 407, 2010 La. Acts. 1787 (requesting that the Law Institute draft comments to the
revisions to Code of Civil Procedure provisions regulating divorce proceedings); Act No.
158, 2004 La. Acts 1138 (requesting that the Law Institute draft comments corresponding to
the revision of provisions governing the giving of security by usufructuaries); Act No. 1082
§4, 2001 La. Acts 2264, 2290 (requesting that the Law Institute draft comments for reforms
to child support guidelines); Act No. 528, 1988 La. Acts 1367 (requesting that the Law
Institute draft comments for revision of law governing security rights).
62. See J. Michael Cutshaw & Walter B. Stewart IV, Louisiana's Banking
Revolution: Recodification and Multibanking, 59 TuL. L. REv. 602, 606 n.27 (1985). For
example, legislation and comments for the Louisiana Banking Law were prepared by the
Louisiana Bankers Association, and the comments were later reviewed by the Law Institute
prior to publication. Act No. 719, 1984 La. Acts 1732. Similarly, the Law Institute did not
prepare the legislation and comments for the Louisiana Assignment of Accounts Receivable
Act. Act No. 319, 1983 La. Acts 625. The legislation and comments were later replaced
with Law Institute legislation and comments on U.C.C. secured transactions. Act No. 128,
2001 La. Acts 206. Legislation and comments for the Louisiana Code of Juvenile Procedure
were not prepared by the Law Institute. Act No. 172, 1978 La. Acts 508. However, the code
was replaced with the Louisiana Children's Code, for which the Law Institute drafted
comments. Act No. 235, 1991 La. Acts 706, 1059. Finally, the Louisiana State Bar
Association prepared the comments for the Louisiana Business Corporation Law. Act No.
105, 1968 La. Acts 266. The comments were later replaced with the Law Institute's
legislation and comments on business corporations. Act No. 328, 2014 La. Acts 1911.
63. See Act No. 719, 1984 La. Acts 1732.
64. See Cutshaw & Stewart, supra note 62, at 606 n.27.
65. See id.; S. Con. Res. 150, 1984 Leg., 10th Reg. Sess. (La. 1984).
60.
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materials.66 The Law Institute in turn created a committee to conduct
this review and ultimately included the comments and explanatory
materials in the official printed version of the text.67 This anecdote
suggests that the legislature regards the Law Institute as the sole body
authorized to prepare and promulgate comments, even with respect to
legislation that it did not prepare.
B.

An UnfamiliarProcessRevealed

As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the Law Institute has a
long tradition of drafting comments for all manner of legislative
enactments. While the bench and bar are familiar with the comments
and their utility, the details surrounding the preparation and
publication of the comments are not well known. The following
materials thus describe the process by which comments are prepared,
presented to the legislature, and ultimately published alongside the
law.
1.

Drafting and Presentation to the Legislature

An understanding of the preparation of legislative comments
requires an appreciation of the Law Institute's general procedures for
law reform. In short, the Law Institute is responsible for making
recommendations to the legislature concerning proposed changes in
the law.68 In pursuit of this function, the Law Institute charges its
numerous committees with conducting studies of the law and, if
appropriate, drafting bills for consideration by the legislature. 69 For
each committee, a reporter is appointed-a legal expert drawn from
the bar, judiciary, or the faculty of one of the four Louisiana law
66. La. S. Con. Res. 150.
67. Cutshaw & Stewart, supra note 62, at 606 n.27.
68. LA. REv. STAT. § 24:204(A)(1) (2017); By-Laws, LA. ST. L. INST. § IV(A),
http://www.1sli.org/by-laws (last visited Sept. 2, 2017). while many of the Law Institute's
proposals originate in a specific request from the legislature, others arise from the Law
Institute's own independent determinations that an area of the law is in need of reform. See
Crawford & Haymon, supra note 20, at 87; see also LA. REv. STAT. § 24:204(A)(2)
(enumerating among the duties of the Law Institute "[t]o examine and study the civil law of
Louisiana and the Louisiana jurisprudence and statutes of the state with a view of discovering
defects and inequities and of recommending needed reforms").
69. See Crawford & Haymon, supra note 20, at 87-88. The reform work of the Law
Institute is conducted entirely through its committees, some of which are charged with
continuous revision of the law, and others of which are charged with special studies. See ByLaws, supra note 68, §§ VIII, IX, X. A complete and up-to-date list of Law Institute
committees may be found on the Law Institute's website. Committees, LA. ST. L. INST.,
http://www.1sli.org/committees (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).
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schools. 70 Committees, although formally appointed by the Law
Institute's President, are nearly always selected by the reporter.71 The
reporter leads the committee in the study of the substantive issue at
hand and, once the committee reaches consensus on the basic policy
of the proposal, prepares draft legislation for the committee's
consideration. 72 After the committee finalizes its proposed
legislation, the reporter makes a presentation of the materials to the
Law Institute's Council (the agency's governing body) for approval
and recommendation to the legislature.73 If the Council so approves,
it is then reviewed by the Coordinating, Semantics, Style and
Publications Committee (Coordinating Committee).7 4 The proposed
legislation is then presented in the form of a bill to the Louisiana
legislature, at which point it enters the usual legislative process for
lawmaking.75
All of the above procedures are regulated in detail by the Law
Institute's By-Laws. 76 However, that governing document is silent on
the topic of legislative comments. 77 For decades, the Law Institute's
procedures for the drafting and review of comments was not
formalized; instead, a customary practice emerged. Not surprisingly,
this practice parallels the process by which the Law Institute prepares
and approves draft legislation.
According to this custom, comments are drafted by the reporter
for each committee contemporaneously with or shortly after the
preparation of the text of the proposed legislation. The comments are
usually discussed and debated by the committee at some length and
70.
68,

§ VI(G)
71.

See Crawford & Haymon, supra note 20, at 87-88; see also By-Laws, supra note
(detailing how the reporters and chairpersons of committees are selected).
See Crawford & Haymon, supra note 20, at 88; see also By-Laws, supra note 68,

§ VI(H) (noting that the President of the Law Institute appoints Committee members, subject
to the reporter's approval).
72.
See Crawford & Haymon, supra note 20, at 88.

73.

See id.; By-Laws, supra note 68,

74.

See By-Laws, supra note 68,

§ IV(C)(3).

§ VIII(D).

As the name implies, this committee is

charged with reviewing all proposed legislation for semantics and style and coordinating all
proposals with existing legislation. Id.
75. See Crawford & Haymon, supra note 20, at 88. It should be noted that although
only members of the legislature may introduce bills, a member of the Law Institute (usually
the reporter) frequently testifies in favor of the bill at the legislative hearings and answers
questions regarding the substance of the proposed law, as well as the comments thereto. Id.
76. See By-Laws, supra note 68.
77. However, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 24:204 does include as part of the
Law Institute duties the following: "To make available translation of civil law materials and
commentaries and to provide by studies and other doctrinal writings, materials for the better
understanding of the civil law of Louisiana and the philosophy upon which it is based."
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undergo numerous revisions in order to reflect the committee's
collective understanding of the proposed revisions and their
relationship to existing law; however, the extent of committee
deliberations regarding comments varies among projects and
reporters. Once finalized by the committee, comments are presented
to the Council along with the text of the proposed law and may be
discussed and revised by the Council during that presentation.
Following the Council's approval of legislation and comments, the
Coordinating Committee performs a final review of the comments
along with the text of the proposed law. When that oversight
committee determines that revisions to the comments are needed, it
works closely with the reporter to make any required changes. As a
final step, comments are incorporated into the draft bills prepared by
the Law Institute staff for recommendation to the legislature.78
The customary practice remained an informal one until just
recently, when the Law Institute's Executive Committee7 9 in 2009
enacted a formal policy for the review of comments.80 According to
that policy, all comments must be reviewed by the Council prior to
submission to the legislature and, if time permits, should also be
reviewed by the Coordinating Committee. 8 The policy does not,
however, speak to the process by which comments are drafted or
whether comments should be approved by committee members prior

78.
See generally Crawford & Haymon, supra note 20 (discussing the Law Institute's
Revision process).
79.
According to the Law Institute's by-laws, the Executive Committee has the
power to transact all business of the Institute. By-Laws, supra note 68, § V(A)(1).
80.
Memorandum from William E. Crawford & Kerry Triche to the Exec. Comm. of
the La. State Law Inst. (Mar. 10, 2009) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
81.
Id. The policy affirmatively states:
No comments shall be included in a legislative bill unless the comments were
presented to the Council at the time the proposals were adopted or at a subsequent
meeting of the Council. If the Council directs the Reporter to add or amend a
comment to an Article that is adopted by the Council, it may also waive the
requirement that the comment be returned to the Council for approval. In addition,
the staff or Reporter may make minor semantic changes without Council approval.
However, when time is of the essence or it [is] otherwise impractical, the
comments may be sent to the Council by e-mail or other means without the

necessity of a formal meeting.
Id. (emphasis omitted). In addition, the policy makes clear that "[i]f the legislature authorizes
the Law Institute to prepare comments to a statute or Code Article [that the Law Institute did

not assist in preparing], those comments shall be reviewed by the Council and a copy sent to
the relevant House or Senate Committee, before being published in the Louisiana Statutes
Annotated." Id.
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Those aspects of drafting remain

Legislative Review and Nonintervention

Because comments prepared in connection with a revision are
included in the same bill proposing those reforms, they are viewed
and actively discussed by the legislators at every step in the legislative
process. 83 However, according to some accounts, once a bill is filed
in one of the houses of the legislature, the comments contained
therein enter an intriguing state of limbo. The recent experience of
some Law Institute reporters has been that once a bill is filed, the
comments contained therein are generally not subject to any
modification, either by legislators or the Law Institute, while the bill
is under consideration.84 Indeed, under this approach, if at any point
during a bill's journey from legislative committee to floor any portion
of the comments is identified as requiring revision, the task is put on
hold until the legislative process is complete. It is only after the law is
82. It should be mentioned that some guidelines for the drafting of comments appear
in the Louisiana State Law Institute Style and Drafting Manual, a manuscript drafted by
Leonard Martin and last revised in 1984. Leonard Martin, Louisiana State Law Institute
Style and Drafting Manual (Sept. 1984) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Louisiana
State Law Institute). This document is unpublished and was never formally adopted by the
Law Institute. For this reason, it is not widely available, nor is it provided to reporters as a
matter of course for use in drafting comments or legislation. Likewise, the Coordinating
Committee does not enforce the guidelines applicable to comments during its final review
prior to submission to the legislature. In fact, this author surmises that very few members of
the Law Institute or its Council are even aware of this document's existence.
83. See, e.g., Hearingon S. 134 Before the H. Comm. on Civil Law and Procedure,
2015 Leg., 41st Reg. Sess. (La. 2015) (statement of Katherine Shaw Spaht, Member, La.
State Law Inst.), http://house.louisiana.gov/H Video/VideoArchivePlayer.aspx?v-house/
2015/may/0526 15_CL; Hearing on HR. 439 Before the S. Comm. on JudiciaryA, 2015
Leg., 41st Reg. Sess. (La. 2015) (statement of Ronald J. Scalise, Member, La. State Law
Inst.), http://senate.1a.gov/video/videoarchive.asp?v-senate/2015/05/051915JUDA 0; Hearing
on HR. 388 Before the H Comm. on Civil Law and Procedure, 2008 Leg., 34th Reg. Sess.
(La. 2008) (statement of William E. Crawford & David Cromwell, Members, La. State Law
Inst.), http://house.louisiana.gov/H _Video/VideoArchivePlayer.aspx?v-house/2008/apr/0421
08_CL (featuring committee discussion of comments associated with revision of the law of
usufruct).
84. This was the experience of the author of this Article when serving as the reporter
for the Mineral Rights-Unsolicited Offers Committee in 2016. When the Sale of Mineral
Rights by Mail Solicitation Act was introduced in the legislature, concerns were raised
regarding the effect of a potential rescission of a sale of mineral rights on third persons.
While the bill was under consideration, the Law Institute agreed to revise a comment to
clarify the issue and was instructed by the legislative staff to defer the change until the
printing of the enacted law. See Minutes of the Meeting of the Council, La. State Law Inst.
(Aug. 12-13, 2016).
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enacted in final form that revisions, whether technical or substantive,
may be made.
The rationale for prohibiting revision of the comments while the
bill is under consideration by the legislature stems from the official
stance that comments "shall not be enactments of the Legislature ...
and shall not be law."85"While early pronouncements of the legislature
concerning comments did not contain this admonition, beginning with
the 1964 Trust Code and continuing through the first revisions to the
Civil Code, the legislature made a point to expressly discount the legal
status of the comments. 86 And, although at first this was done on an
enactment-by-enactment basis, in 1978 the legislature enacted a
standing rule (now Joint Rule 10) designed to address in a
comprehensive manner all comments prepared by the Law Institute.8 7
This rule provides that any bill submitted on recommendation of the
Law Institute may include revision comments and further states
definitively that "[c]omments included in the bill shall not be
enactments of the Legislature ... and shall not be law."88 In addition,
the rule provides the Law Institute with standing authority to publish
comments in the official version of the pertinent law.89 According to
the rule, publication may be accomplished "with such changes to be
85. H.R. Con. Res. 58, 1978 Leg., 4th Reg. Sess. (La. 1978).
86. The negation of the comments' status as legislation first appeared in connection
with the enactment of the Trust Code in 1964. See H.R. Con. Res. 28, 1964 Leg., 27th Reg.
Sess. (La. 1964) ("[T]he printed House Bill No. 417 prepared by the Louisiana State Law
Institute is accepted in lieu of any other printed copy, except that the source notes and
comments therein shall not be considered to be a part of the proposed law nor acted upon as
such .. .. "). A similar statement was later made in connection with the Code of Criminal
Procedure in 1966. Article 10 of that enactment provides that "[t]he headings of the articles
of this Code, and the source notes and comments thereunder do not constitute parts of the

law." Act No. 310, 1966 La. Acts 5; see also H.R. Con. Res. 10, 1966 Leg., 29th Reg. Sess.
(La. 1966) (directing publication of comments and stating that comments shall not be
enactments of law). The enactment of the Mineral Code in 1974 came with a similar
admonition. See S. Con. Res. 2, 1974 Leg., 37th Reg. Sess. (La. 1974) ("The comments
under the various articles of the mineral code shall be printed in said Senate Bill No. 66,
which proposes the adoption of the mineral code, but the comments shall not be considered
as part of the proposed law."). Later, the 1976 revision of the law of personal servitudes
contained a similar pronouncement. See Act No. 103, 1976 La. Acts 321, 430 ("The article
headnotes, the Expos6 des Motifs and the Comments in this Act are not intended to be
considered as part of the law and are not enacted into law by virtue of their inclusion in this
Act.").
87. La. H.R. Con. Res. 58. The resolution was prepared at the request of
Representative Frank Simoneaux, with the apparent purpose of relieving Law Institute staff
from the necessity of preparing resolutions for each legislative session relative to the
introduction and consideration of Law Institute comments. Id.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id.
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as [the Law Institute] may deem necessary to accurately

reflect the sections or articles as enacted" or subsequently amended.90
Joint Rule 10 thus explicitly recognizes that the Law Institute may
revise comments after the law's enactment so that they may best
conform with the final enactment.
It is important to note that the legislature does not uniformly
disallow the amendment of comments during the legislative process.
Indeed, there have been occasions on which comments contained
within a bill have been revised contemporaneously with amendments
to the legislative text of a bill. For example, when the law of filiation
was revised in 2006, the comments to article 186 were removed
entirely from the bill following extensive amendments to the text of
the law while it was under committee consideration in the House. 91
Thus, despite the fact that comments feature prominently in legislative
debates regarding the text, there appears to be no clear legislative
policy regarding whether they are subject to amendment or
modification during the legislative process.
3.

Publication and Post-Enactment Revision

Once the law is enacted, comments are published alongside the
law at the Law Institute's direction.92 As part of its "continuous
revision" authority, the Law Institute is responsible for coordinating
the printing of all legislation enacted, amended, or repealed each
year.93 In fulfillment of this duty, at the close of each legislative
session the Law Institute prepares a "printer's copy" of those portions
of the various codes, Revised Statutes, and Louisiana Constitution
that were affected by legislation or constitutional amendment.94 Each
90. Id. Even before 1978, the legislature often granted this authority on an act-by-act
basis. Indeed, even the very first legislative enactment concerning the comments-the
resolution directing publication of the comments to the Criminal Code-bestowed on the
Law Institute the power to make "such changes ... as may be necessary because of
amendments to the ... Code adopted by this Legislature." S. Con. Res. 12, 1942 Leg., 11th
Reg. Sess. (La. 1942).
91. Compare H.R. 91, 2005 Leg., 31st Reg. Sess. (La. 2005) (original draft)
(including revision comments), with Act No. 192, 2005 La. Acts 1444 (lacking revision
comments). For more discussion of these comments and their revision, see infra notes 107112 and accompanying text.
92. Notably, comments are neither enacted nor promulgated so much that they are
published-that is, produced in print alongside the text of the law to which they appertain.
See LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 3, § 5.1 (discussing the distinction between promulgation
and publication of law).
93. LA. REv. STAT. §§ 24:251-:256 (2017).
94. Id. § 24:252.
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printer's copy includes any comments that accompanied proposed
legislation. The law and comments are then published by the official
printer of Louisiana's laws.95 Comments also appear in some, but not
all, of the other commercially available publications of the law.96 And
intriguingly, while the comments appear in the official publications,
they are not prominently featured alongside the law on the Louisiana
Legislature's own website.97
As might be expected, comments are revised with some
frequency after the legislation that they accompany is enacted,98
sometimes extensively so, usually prior to the law's publication. 99 As
the legislative process unfolds, comments may require revision for
95.
Like many states, Louisiana has designated an "official" printer for its legislative
enactments-a private publisher tasked with the printing, publication, sale and distribution of
Louisiana laws. See id. § 24:256. Currently, Thomson Reuters (formerly known as West
Publishing Company) is designated as the official printer. LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 3,
§ 5.3. As is discussed infra at notes 99 through 113, the Law Institute has wide latitude to
revise the comments following enactment. The printer's copy thus includes all postenactment revisions made prior to publication of the law. Notably, the printer's copy may
also contain changes to the legislative text; again, the Law Institute has wide latitude to make
editorial changes to the law, provided they remain of a purely formal or clerical nature "in
keeping with the purpose of the revision." LA. REV. STAT. § 24:253. Thus, for example,
when the law of conflicts of law was enacted in 1991, the printer's copy differed from the
enacting statute with respect to the content of the comments (which were substantially
revised post-revision). In addition, a profound structural change was made: the provisions,
which were designated as Civil Code articles 14-49 in the enacting legislation, were
redesignated as a new Book IV of the Civil Code in the printer's copy. Compare Act No.
923 arts. 14-49, 1991 La. Acts, 2747, with LA. CIV. CODE arts. 14, 3515-3549 (2017).
96.
Compare LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed., Thomson Reuters
2017) (containing comments), and LOUISIANA CtVIL CODE (Melissa T. Lonegrass ed., 2017)
(containing comments), with LOUISIANA POCKET CIVIL CODE (Alain Levasseur ed., 2017)
(omitting comments).
97.
At the same time the printer's copy is disseminated to commercial publishers, it
is also disseminated to state officials, including the secretary of the Senate and the clerk of
the House of Representatives. LA. REv. STAT. § 24:253.2; see LAMONICA & JONES, supra
note 3, § 5.3. These final, published revisions are then input into the House of
Representatives database, which in turn populates the "laws" database on the Louisiana
Legislature's website, although without the accompanying comments.
98. See, e.g., Louisiana State Law Institute Printer's Copy 2014, LA. CIV. CODE arts.
3155 cmt. c, 3163 cmt. d (reflecting minor revisions); Louisiana State Law Institute Printer's
Copy 2015, LA. CIv. CODE arts. 230 cmts. a, c, 232 cmt. b (reflecting more extensive
revisions).
99.
For example, the comments to article 14 were revised heavily following

enactment of the conflicts of law rules in 1991, owing largely to the fact that the Law
Institute determined post-enactment to relegate conflicts of law to a fourth book of the Civil
Code. Compare Act No. 923, 1991 La. Acts 2747 (comments enacted), with LA. CIV. CODE
arts. 14, 3515-3549 (1992) (comments published). In addition, the comments accompanying

a number of articles included within the 1995 revision of the Civil Code title on sales were
amended following enactment. Compare Act. No. 841, 1993 La. Acts 2239 (comments
enacted), with LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2439-59 (2017) (current comments).

20 17]

HIDDENLAW

28 5

any number of reasons. For one thing, despite the fact that comments
are carefully crafted by reporters and subject to several levels of
review prior to their submission to the legislature, they sometimes
contain typographical errors and substantive inaccuracies that are
identified during the legislative process. Moreover, if any portion of
the text of a bill is amended prior to the bill's final passage, then the
comments may require a corresponding modification. Finally, as a
bill works its way through legislative committees and onto the floor of
each house, legislators and lobbyists may identify comments that are
imprecise or confusing, or which raise worrisome concerns about the
policies underlying proposed revisions. The revision of comments
thus may be required to better reflect the true intent of the drafters, as
well as that of the legislature.
Within the Law Institute, it is the reporter of the committee who
prepared the projet who is principally responsible for revising
comments. 100 Whether the reporter solicits the assistance of the
committee is a matter of discretion, as the reporter is given great
leeway in determining whether the required changes merit committee
input. Significant freedom is also given to the reporter to make
semantic changes to comments or correct minor errors without
soliciting the approval of the Council. Major revisions, on the other
hand, have historically required Council approval prior to printing.
For most of the Law Institute's history, the revision of comments,
much like their drafting, was left to informal rather than formal
procedures.
In recent years, however, the Law Institute has
formalized the process by which comments are revised prior to
publication. In the same 2009 policy formalizing the presentation of
the comments to the Council prior to submission to the legislature, the
Law Institute clarified that reporters may revise published comments
"to conform the comments to a legislative amendment, to correct an
inaccuracy, or to respond to a need for clarification.",o Significantly,
the reporter does not have unfettered freedom in this regard; the
policy requires that "[a]ll substantive changes" be submitted to the
Council for review prior to publication.102 The sticking point, of
100. The legislature specifically directed that revisions to the Criminal Code be
undertaken by the reporters. See La. S. Con. Res. 12.
101. Memorandum from William E. Crawford & Kerry Triche, supra note 80. The
policy also states that "[a]fter a bill is enacted, the staff may make changes to the comments
(and the law) in accordance with R.S. 24:253," the Law Institute's continuous revision
authority. Id.
102. Id.
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course, is the distinction between "substantive" changes (which
require Council approval) and non-substantive changes (which do
not).
As expected, even after the formalization of the Law Institute's
procedures, there has occasionally been controversy concerning
whether post-enactment revisions of comments are appropriate. One
example involved revisions to the law of usufruct in 2010. Following
the law's enactment, the reporter revised the comments extensively. 103
The comments were submitted to the Council for approval and
ultimately approved prior to the official printing of the law.104 While
the official compilation of the law contains the revised comments, this
is not true for all commercial publications of the Civil Code. Indeed,
Professor Yiannopoulos, the former editor of a widely available
version of the Civil Code, believed that the reporters' revisions
exceeded the Law Institute's authority and refused to print the revised
comments alongside the law.105 In an introductory note preceding the
articles on usufruct, Yiannopoulos wrote:
In November 2010, months after Acts 2010, No. 881, acquired the force
of law, the Louisiana State Law Institute prepared a new set of

comments for the amended texts. Because those Comments have not
been part of the legislative process and are merely doctrinal materials

containing ex post facto explanations they are not reproduced in this

edition. 106

While this was certainly not the first time that a Law Institute reporter
had revised comments following a bill's enactment, this seems to be
the only occasion on which Yiannopoulos refused to print revised
comments in his publication. Yiannopoulos' concern may have been
based less on the fact that comments were revised and more on the
fact that many of the articles for which comments were drafted after
enactment were included in the bill with no accompanying comments.
103. Compare Act No. 881, 2010 La. Acts 3037 (lacking extensive comments), with
LA. Civ. CODE arts. 538, 549, 553, 558, 567-569, 573-575, 577, 580-581, 583-584, 586-594,
601, 603-604, 608, 613, 615-616, 618-620, 623-625 (2011) (containing additional, heavily
revised 2010 revision comments).
104. Minutes of the Meeting of the Council, La. State Law Inst. (Sept. 10-11, 2010);
Minutes of the Meeting of the Council, La. State Law Inst. (Oct. 15-16, 2010); Email from
Gloria Girouard to Members of the Council of the La. State Law Inst. (Oct. 4, 2010, 10:35
AM) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
105. See IntroductoryNote to LOUISIANA ClVIL CODE 135, 135 (A.N. Yiannopoulos
ed., 2011); see also 2 LouIsIANA CIvIL CODE 569-76 (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed., West 2011)
(relegating the comments to an appendix).
106. Introductory Note, supra note 105, at 135.
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For those articles, the comments were not merely revised, they were
drafted anew.
While revisions usually occur in the months following a bill's
enactment-that is, just prior to the first publication of the revised
law-on some occasions comment revisions have been postponed,
even for several years. One instance involves the 2005 revision of the
law of filiation-specifically, the comments to Civil Code article
186.107 While comments were initially drafted to accompany the
article, the provision underwent major amendments prior to
enactment.10 8 The comments, rendered inapposite, were dropped
from the amended bill prior to its approval.109 Despite the Law
Institute's undisputed authority to draft and print a revised comment
immediately upon the article's enactment, the article was published in
2006 without any accompanying comments. 110 Indeed, the article
remained without comments for four years. It was not until the
printing of the Civil Code in 2010 that a revised comment to article
186 appeared.1, And, although presumably the Law Institute's
authority to draft and print an appropriate comment to article 186 had
not somehow expired, the comment was not simply prepared and
printed but instead was included within proposed legislation seeking

107. That article sets forth the presumption of paternity when a child is bom within
300 days of the termination of a marriage, and the mother has married again before the

child's birth. LA. CIV. CODE art. 186 (2017).
108. The original proposal of the Law Institute was for the legislation to state that if
the previous marriage was terminated by judgment of divorce, declaration of nullity, or

declaration of death under article 54, then the second husband is presumed to be the father of
the child. H.R. 91, 2005 Leg., 31st Reg. Sess. (La. 2005) (original draft). If, on the other
hand, the previous marriage was terminated by the husband's death, then the first husband is

presumed to be the father of the child. Id. Members of the Senate Committee were
presumably concerned that any presumption that the second husband was the father of the
child was, in effect, a presumption that the mother had violated her marital obligations
through adultery. The article was thus entirely rewritten to provide that regardless of the

cause of the termination of the marriage, the first husband is presumed to be the father of the
child. Act No. 192, 2005 La. Acts 1444.
109. In this regard, this bill involved an instance in which the legislature was willing to
revise the comments during the legislative process. Compare La. H.R. 91 (articulating a
presumption for filiation), with Act No. 192, 2005 La. Acts 1444 (revising the original
presumption). See also supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text for discussion of the
legislature's unwillingness to revise comments prior to the enactment of the law.

110. LA. CIV. CODE art. 186 (2006).
111.

Compare LA. CiV. CODE art. 186 (2010) (including revision comments), with LA.

CIV. CODE art. 186 (2009) (lacking revision comments), LA. CIV. CODE art. 186 (2008)
(same), LA. CIV. CODE art. 186 (2007) (same), and LA. CIV. CODE art. 186 (2006) (same).
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to revise the law of filiation and adoption.112 It appears as though the
Law Institute thought it necessary, or at least advisable, to present the
comment to the legislature for review, if not implicit approval.
4.

Post-Publication Revision

Once published, comments are rarely revised. Instead, they
generally remain in the state in which they were first printed, in
perpetuity. This is true even if the provision to which they appertain is
later amended and new comments are drafted to explain the change.
Instead of replacing previously drafted comments, the new comments
are printed above the old. Fastidious reporters take care to point out in
the new comments those portions of the old comments that are no
longer accurate.1 13 Otherwise, no updates to the comments are made.
The general rule against revision admits just a few isolated
exceptions. One example involves the 2014 revision of the law of
security rights, during which the comments to several provisions
governing the inscription of mortgages were updated without
corresponding revision to the text of the law.114 This unusual case was
precipitated by the precise circumstances surrounding previous
reforms of the same rules. First, when law governing mortgages was
comprehensively revised in 1992, comments were drafted to
accompany the updated articles, and those comments were
subsequently printed alongside the text.1 15 Later, in 2005, when the
law of registry was comprehensively revised, the articles on mortgage
inscription were redesignated (that is, moved and renumbered),
largely without amendment and, inexplicably, the 1992 comments
were neither included in the 2005 legislation 116 nor reprinted
alongside the redesignated articles (that is, they simply vanished). 17
The 2014 security devices revision presented an opportunity for the
Law Institute to restore the lost comments and, in the process, to
revise them as necessary to reflect the current state of the law.'18
112. Act No. 3, 2009 La. Acts 4. The comments to article 186 were not the only
material relevant to filiation. The Act also enacted article 178 (defining filiation) and article

179 (establishing the methods by which filiation occurs). Id.
113. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1849 cmt. a (2017) ("In light of this Article,
comment (c) to Article 1848 [enacted in 1984] should no longer be considered in the context

of proving
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

the existence of simulations.").
See Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts 1765.
See Act No. 1132, 1992 La. Acts 3123.
See Act No. 169, 2005 La. Acts 1383.
See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3354-3368 (2007).
See Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts 1765.
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Though the revision of comments following their publication is
unusual, it has occurred with sufficient frequency that the Law
Institute thought it advisable to address the possibility of postpublication revision in a formal policy. In 2005, the Law Institute's
Executive Committee adopted a policy permitting "[p]ublished
comments [to] be revised by the Reporter and the committee with
jurisdiction over the subject matter."I1 9 However, such revision occurs
only "subject to approval by the Council and the Coordinating
Committee."20 Although the policy does not require the revisions to
be passed before the legislature prior to printing, the practice has been
to include comment revisions in legislation revising related
provisions.121

Only once has the legislature specifically directed the Law
Institute to revise previously published comments.1 2 2 This wellknown instance involves the comments accompanying Civil Code
article 1493, the contentious provision defining "forced heirs."123
When the law of forced heirship was comprehensively revised in
1996, the definition of forced heirship was substantially modified so
that forced heirs no longer included all descendants of the decedent
but only two categories of descendants: (1) those "twenty-three years
of age or younger" at the time of the decedent's death and (2) those
"permanently incapable of taking care of their persons or
administering their estates" at the time of the decedent's death.124 The
latter category was not proposed by the Law Institute but was instead
borne of a legislative amendment. Thus, a post-enactment comment
was required to expound upon the change.1 25 Once the comment was
printed, the legislature objected, finding that the comment suggested a
requirement for forced heirship that was unsupported by the text of
the law.1 26 It therefore passed a resolution in 1998 requiring the Law
Institute to amend the comment to conform with the legislative

119.

Email from William E. Crawford to the Exec. Comm. of the La. State Law Inst.

(May 23, 2005, 2:12 PM) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts 1765 (including comments for provisions
on mortgage records in the security devices revision); Act No. 3, 2009 La. Acts 4 (including
comments for Civil Code article 186 in the revision of filiation and adoption provisions).

122. See H.R. Con. Res. 1, 1998 Leg., 29th Extra. Sess. (La. 1998).
123.
124.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 cmts. a-e (2017).
Act No. 77, 1996 La. Acts 1015; see generally Spaht, supra note 3 (discussing

the revisions to forced heirship).
125.

See Spaht, supra note 3, at 77 n.100.

126.

See La. H.R. Con. Res. 1.
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intent.127 Indeed, the legislature not only directed that the comment be
revised, it provided specific instructions as to what the comment
should say.128
III. COMMENTS AS A HIDDEN SOURCE OF LAW
Officially, the conventional wisdom surrounding commentsthat they are not the law-is correct. According to the Civil Code, the
sources of law in Louisiana are, exclusively, "legislation and
custom."1 29 Legislative comments, of course, are neither.130 Instead,

the comments-drafted by the scholars of the Law Institute and
included in proposed bills for the legislators' edification-constitute
doctrine.1 31 Moreover, numerous legislative enactments state broadly
and incontrovertibly that comments are not law. The Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedurel3 2 and the Louisiana Children's Codel 33 contain
general statements negating the legislative force of comments, as do
countless individual legislative acts amending and reenacting various
provisions of the Civil Code,134 the Code of Civil Procedure,1 35 and
127. Id. Notably, a resolution was introduced in the House by Representative Riddle
(the same author of Resolution No. 1 of 1998) during the 1997 Regular session. See H.R.
Con. Res. 23, 1997 Leg., 23rd Reg. Sess. (La. 1997). The resolution was scheduled to be
heard by the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure but did not progress further in
the legislative process that session. HCR23, LA. ST. LEGISLATURE, http://www.legis.1a.gov/
legis/Billnfo.aspx?s97RS&bl1HCR23&sbi=y (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).
128. See La. H.R. Con. Res. 1; see also infra notes 140-145 and accompanying text
(discussing the legislature's instructions to the Law Institute to revise the comments to clearly
reflect legislative intent).
129. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2017).
130. See id. art. 2 ("Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will."); id. art. 3
("Custom results from practice repeated for a long time and generally accepted as having
acquired the force of law.").
13 1. See Panel Discussion, The Great Debate Over the Louisiana Civil Code's
Revision, 5 TuL. Civ. L.F. 49, 75, 79 (1990) (Professor David Gruning equating comments
with doctrine); Kimberly D. Higginbotham, Comment, Reimbursement for Satisfaction of
Community Obligations with Separate Property: Getting What's Yours, 68 LA. L. REv. 181,
200 (2007) ("Though not a formal source of law, the doctrine contained in comments is still
persuasive authority in Louisiana.").
132. LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 10 (2017) ("The headings of the articles of this Code,
and the source notes and comments thereunder do not constitute parts of the law.").
133.

LA. CHILD. CODE art. 111 (2017) ("The headings of the Articles of this Code and

any comments thereto are for convenient reference and do not constitute parts of the law.").
134. See, e.g., Act No. 187 § 6, 1982 La. Acts, No. 518, 569 ("The Expose de motif
[sic], the article headnotes, and the comments in this Act are not part of the law and are not
enacted into law by virtue of their inclusion in this Act."); Act No. 77 § 4, 1996 La. Acts
1015, 1044 ("The introductory note, headings, source lines, and comments in this Act are not
part of the law and are not enacted into law by virtue of their inclusion in this Act."); Act No.
1078 § 7, 1997 La. Acts 1885, 1897 ("The headings, source lines, and comments in this Act
are not part of the law and are not enacted into law by virtue of their inclusion in this Act.").
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the Louisiana Revised Statutes.1 36 Indeed, since 1978 the general law
governing Louisiana's legislative process has been completely clear
that comments accompanying any bill submitted to the legislature
"shall not be law."137
Despite the fact that they do not have the force of law, the
comments enjoy an authority and significance that is unlike that of
any other form of doctrine. The following subpart describes the ways
in which comments approximate law, both through their preparation
and through their use.
A.

Quasi-Legislationand De FactoLaw

First, comments enjoy an authority that may be viewed as
inherent; irrespective of the manner in which they are employed, they
are imbued with legal force by virtue of the processes by which they
are made and published. Even while the comments are expressly
distinguished from legislation, they undeniably have some legislative
character that is not shared by other doctrinal writing. Moreover,
courts regularly rely on comments to discern legislative intent,
determine the proper interpretation of the law, and resolve actual
conflicts. Thus, as described below, the comments have a quasilegislative status and, in practice, constitute a source of law.
1.

Comments as Quasi-Legislation

Despite the legislature's repeated pronouncements denying the
legislative force of the comments, the comments bear a "stamp of

135. See, e.g., Act No. 173 § 2, 1989 La. Acts 673, 675 ("The headings, source lines
and comments in this Act are not part of the law and are not enacted into law by virtue of
their inclusion in this Act.").
136. See, e.g., Act No. 989 § 9, 1990 La. Acts 2417, 2454 ("The Expose [sic] des
Motifs, headings, source lines, and comments in this Act are not part of the law and are not
enacted into law by virtue of their inclusion in this Act.").
137. Louisiana Senate Rules of Order, Joint Rule of Order of the Senate and House of
Representatives No. 10, LA. ST. LEGISLATURES, https://legis.1a.gov/Legis/Law.aspx?d=113
406 (last visited Sept. 10, 2017) ("A bill submitted on the recommendation of the Louisiana
State Law Institute may be introduced and considered by the Senate and House of
Representatives in pamphlet form and, whether in pamphlet form or not, may include
introductory comments and explanatory comments following proposed sections or articles.
Comments included in the bill shall not be enactments of the Legislature, and shall be
included only as explanatory language, and shall not be law, but may be printed in the official
edition of the pertinent law with such changes to be made therein by the Louisiana State Law
Institute as it may deem necessary to accurately reflect the sections or articles as enacted, or
subsequently amended.").
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legislative approval" that is difficult to ignore.13 8 This stamp of
approval is first a formal one: the very inclusion of the comments in
the bills and the resulting acts incorporates those comments into the
legislative process in the same manner as the text of the law.
However, the approval of the legislature is not merely a matter of
physical proximity and timing. Because the legislature actively
considers the text of the law and the comments in tandem during
debates, the text is necessarily approved in light of the accompanying
comments. The comments are thus assimilated into the legislative
intent: the law that is enacted is the law as it is justified, explained,
and interpreted by the comments.
Professor Yiannopoulos once characterized the notion that the
comments reflect the legislative intent as an "illusion," remarking that,
"[i]n reality, the Reporter's comments merely reflect the Reporter's
own intent and explanations."139 While it is certainly true that
comments are authored by Law Institute reporters, the same can be
said for the legislative text. It is not the identity of the drafter that
gives the law its force, but the process of legislative approval. When
the text and comments are reviewed and approved as one
interconnected package, it is difficult to distinguish between the
legislature's express approval of the text and its implicit approval of
the comments. It is presumably the thinness of this line that has
prompted the legislature to repeatedly and unambiguously denounce
the comments' status as law. And while those many legislative
decrees cannot be ignored, it must also be recognized that the
comments, though not law, are quite authoritative.
It may be more accurate to consider the gradations of authority
bestowed upon particular types of legislative comments. At the center
of the spectrum lies the bulk of legislative comments-the variety that
is included within a bill for the legislature's consideration but that is
free of legislative direction or interference. These comments, though
not law, are quasi-legislative by virtue of their role in the lawmakers'
approval of the text.
Now consider the spectrum's poles. At one end of the spectrum,
some comments enjoy heightened authority as a result of the
legislature's involvement in their drafting. Recall that from time to
time, the legislature specifically instructs the Law Institute to craft
comments to reflect a particular iteration of legislative intent. Those
138. Zengel, supra note 41, at 960.
139. Yiannopoulos, supranote 54, at 406.
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comments, rare though they may be, enjoy a special legislative
imprimatur that makes them practically incontrovertible. Consider,
for instance, the post-enactment revision of the comments to Civil
Code article 1493. In its original form, comment (c) to that article
provided as follows:
More important, the Legislature added the word "permanently" before
the word "incapable" for the express purpose of emphasizing that a
temporary disability, even if severe, should not apply. The legislature
thereby expressly manifested its intent that the rule making disabled
children of any age forced heirs should only apply to "seriously
handicapped" individuals. The Legislature requested specifically that
these Comments be written to explain that it is the purpose of adding
the word "permanently" to more effectively express the public policy
intended, namely, to protect children who are over the age of 23 as
forced heirs if, and only if, they are severely disabled. 140
As described above in Part II.B.4, the legislature took issue with this
comment following its publication and expressly directed that it be
revised to more accurately reflect the legislative intent regarding the
meaning of "permanently incapable." 41 Rather than leaving the
determination of that intent to the reporter, the legislature gave
explicit instructions. Reacting to the comment's statement that the
permanent incapacity be "severe," the legislature retorted: "[T]he
language of the Civil Code Article 1493 does not require that the child
prove that he is either 'severely disabled' or 'seriously handicapped'
but instead provides protection for a child who is 'permanently
2
incapable of caring for his person or administering his property."'4
The legislature further instructed that "the terms 'disabled' and
'handicapped' are terms not adopted by the legislature and not
necessarily coextensive with the standard 'incapable of caring for his
person or administering his property."'l4 3 Indeed, the resolution went
so far as to direct the Law Institute to "delet[e] all references
describing such incapable children in terms other than those used in
the article, to wit: children who are 'permanently incapable of caring
for their persons or administering their estates."'144 The Law Institute
of course complied with the legislature's directive. The relevant
language of the comment now provides simply that the word
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 cmt. c (1997).
See supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
H.R. Con. Res. 1, 1998 Leg., 26th Extra. Sess. (La. 1998).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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"permanently" was included before the word "incapable" "for the
express purpose of emphasizing that a temporary incapacity or
infirmity, even if severe, should not apply."45
A similarly precise directive was given on another occasion, this
one involving 2001 reforms to the law governing the guidelines for
the calculation of child support.1 46 While the Law Institute did not
prepare the bill introducing those reforms, the enacting legislation
directed the Law Institute to prepare comments to the revised statutes
and Civil Code articles that had been affected.147 In addition to this
general request, the legislature in a separate resolution set forth
specific instructions regarding the substance of the comments to one
of the many provisions that had been revised: Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 9:315.9, a provision regulating the calculation of child
support obligations in shared custody arrangements.1 48 Rather than
leave the explanation of this rule to the reporter's judgment, the
legislature pointedly directed the Law Institute to:
[C]Iarify that in the calculation of a support obligation in a shared
custodial arrangement, each parent's share of the basic support
obligation shall be cross-multiplied by fifty percent or the actual
percentage of time the child spends with the other parent and the parent
owing the greater amount pays the difference to the other parent as
support, after deducting each parent's proportionate share of direct
payments ordered to be made to a third party on behalf of the child.1 49
The Law Institute faithfully executed this mandate, drafting a
comment that substantially tracks the legislature's own language.15o
145. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 cmt. c; see In re Succession of Carroll, 48,436-CA, p. 3
n.1 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/25/13); 125 So. 3d 505, 507 n.1. Notably, despite the legislature's
directive, the comment expounding upon the nature of disability required for a grandchildof
the decedent to qualify as a forced heir was not revised. Thus, comment (e) continues to state
that to qualify, "the grandchild must be severely disabled." LA. Civ. CODE art. 1493 cmt. e
(emphasis added). The comment then refers the reader back to comment (c) for additional

discussion of the severity requirement. Id. In light of the 1999 legislative directive, this
comment is unquestionably inconsistent with legislative intent. What force, if any, should it

be afforded?
146. H.R. Con. Res. 2, 2001 Leg., 30th Extra. Sess. (La. 2001).
147. Act No. 1082 § 4, 2001 La. Acts 2264, 2290.
148. La. H.R. Con. Res. 2.
149. Id.
150.

The comment provides in part:

Secondly, each parent's share of the basic support obligation shall be crossmultiplied by fifty percent or the actual percentage of time the child spends with
the other parent and the parent owing the greater amount pays the difference to the

other parent as support, after deducting each parent's proportionate share of direct
payments ordered to be made to a third party on behalf of the child. This
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In both of the cases described above, the legislature all but wrote
the comments itself, memorializing its intent regarding their substance
in the form of resolutions. Thus, the legislature has produced
comments-or at least portions thereof-which are essentially
legislation: "[A] solemn expression of legislative will."151
At the other end of the spectrum are comments that are drafted
or extensively revised after the legislation to which they appertain is
enacted. While post-enactment comments may be unquestionably
helpful, they are not as interconnected with the text as those
considered contemporaneously with the law at the time of enactment
or those drafted according to a specific direction of the legislature.
These post-enactment comments are more of the nature of traditional
scholarly doctrine, which, although not integral in the formation of
legislative intent, routinely engages in educated guessing about the
legislative will. This is not to say that post-enactment comments carry
no influence; when comments are drafted by respected experts who
were instrumental in the preparation of the law and its approval by the
legislature, they should be afforded appropriate intellectual weight
even if they are lacking in legislative sanction. The comments drafted
to accompany the Children's Code in 1991 are a prime example of
post-enactment comments that, due to the timing of their drafting, are
only indirectly indicative of legislative intent. Although drafted by
many of the same scholars and practitioners who prepared and
presented the text of the Children's Code to the legislature, these
comments were prepared only after the law was enacted and were thus
not considered by the legislature contemporaneously with the
legislative text.
If the quasi-legislative force of comments drafted entirely after a
law's enactment is attenuated, so too is that of comments that, though
initially passed before the legislature alongside proposed legislation,
are subsequently revised. Even when they are made in order to align
the comments with the law as ultimately enacted, post-enactment
revisions, though perhaps quite reliable, reflect the intent and
Nevertheless, even while
understanding of the drafter alone.
calculation reflects the fact that each parent has physical custody of the child for
approximately one-half of the year.
LA. REv. STAT. § 9:315.9 cmt. b (2017). As a belt-and-suspenders initiative, the legislature
later enacted legislation to clarify the calculation of child support for shared custody. See Act
No. 62, 2002 La. Acts 1258; Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Two "Ics" of the 2001 Louisiana
Child Support Guidelines: Economics and Politics, 62 LA. L. REv. 709, 725 n.64 (2002).

151. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2 (2017).
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lessening the comments' legislative force, post-enactment revision is
designed to, and hopefully does, enhance their accuracy and utility,
and thereby, their intellectual influence.
The placement of comments on a continuum of quasi-legislative
authority is not an attempt to calculate precisely the weight of
authority to be attributed to any particular comment. Rather, the
exercise is intended to demonstrate only that the comments are not
equally authoritative, and that their relationship to the text is affected
by many factors: the legislature's input into their content, the timing of
their drafting and presentation to the legislature, and the extent to
which they are subsequently revised.
2.

Comments as De Facto Law

Aside from the process by which comments are made, the
authoritative nature of comments stems also from the jurisprudence.
An examination of cases construing comments reveals that the courts
consider the comments to be highly authoritative, even sometimes as
authoritative as the text itself.
First, it must be observed that Louisiana courts have in numerous
cases perfunctorily recited the conventional wisdom that "the
comments are not law" just before relying upon the comments to
determine the proper interpretation of legislative text. 152 So common
is this seeming turnabout that the refrain against the comment's legal
force has been converted from a rule into an introductory phrase for
its exception.153 Thus, the comments are expressly denied the force of
law, but they are nonetheless used to determine outcomes.
The fact that courts use comments to interpret legislative text is
not surprising, nor is it necessarily a cause for concern. Courts rightly
point out that there is good reason to trust and rely upon the
152. See, e.g., Cent. Props. v. Fairway Gardenhomes, LLC, 2016-C-1855, pp. 14-15
(La. 6/27/17); 2017 WL 2837152, at *8 (citing comment to Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 47:2156 as revealing the legislative intent); Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 2015-CJ-1812,

pp. 8-9 (La. 3/15/16); 188 So. 3d 231, 238-39 (finding the comments to Civil Code article
131 to be "greatly instructive"); In re Siverd, 2008 CA 2383, p. 5 n.3 (La. App. 1 Cir.
9/11/09); 24 So. 3d 228, 231 n.3 (relying on comment to Article 1577 as "an extrinsic aid that
assists in statutory interpretation"); Robinson v. N. Am. Royalties, Inc., 463 So. 2d 1384,
1388 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1985) (maintaining that Article 128 of the Mineral Code "must be
considered in connection with the official reporter's comment").
153. See, e.g., Arabic v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 2010-C-2605, p. 4 (La. 3/13/12); 89
So. 3d 307, 312 ("While the Official Revision Comments are not the law, they may be

helpful in determining legislative intent."); Thigpen v. Boswell, 465 So. 2d 865, 867 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 1985) ("The comments of the reporter are not law, but they show the intent of the

drafter of the articles." (emphasis added)).
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comments. In some cases, courts unconsciously call upon their quasilegislative force, referring to the comments as the "official comments"
or "official revision comments."154 In other cases, courts more
deliberately tie the comments' weight to their role in the legislative
process. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has observed, "While the
revision comments do not form part of the law, they were presented
together with the proposed legislation and illuminate the
understanding and intent of the legislators."155 The Supreme Court
has described comments as having "legislative sanction."156 Indeed,
many state157 and federal court 5 8 opinions describe the comments as
indicative of the legislative intent.159 Thus, courts tend to recognize
154. See, e.g., Cent. Props., 2016-C-1855 at p. 11; 2017 WL 2837152, at *6; L.J.D. v.
M.V.S., 2016 CA 0008, p. 5 n.5 (La. App. I Cir. 1/25/17); 212 So. 3d 581, 585 n. 5; Tracie
F., 2015-CJ-1812 at p. 8; 188 So. 3d at 238; Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc.,

2004-0968, p. 11 (La. 1/19/05); 893 So. 2d 789, 797; State v. Bennett, 610 So. 2d 120, 124
(La. 1992); Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1068 n.31 (La. 1992); see also
Yiannopoulos, supra note 54, at 406 (noting that the comments are termed "official
comments" and concluding that for that reason, "undue weight is attributed to them in the
process of interpretation of the law").
155. Wartelle v. Women's & Children's Hosp., Inc., 97-0744, p. 9 (La. 12/2/97); 704

So. 2d 778, 783.
156. State v. Daniels, 109 So. 2d 896, 898 n.3 (La. 1958) ("It is appropriate to take
into consideration these reporters' comments to the Criminal Code, which have legislative
sanction, in the interpretation and construction of the articles therein."); see also State v.

Broadnax, 45 So. 2d 604, 609 (La. 1950); State v. Davis, 23 So. 2d 801, 808 (La. 1945)
(looking to the comments of the Criminal Code).
157. See, e.g., In re Succession of James, 2007-2509, p. 9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/21/08);
994 So. 2d 120, 125-26 ("The legislature did not clearly and unequivocally express, in either
the act, the new law, or revision comments, an intent to have new article LSA-C.C. art. 197
apply retroactively to revive the right, claim, or cause of action at issue here."); In re

Succession of Martinez, 98-962, p. 4 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/10/99); 729 So. 2d 22, 24 ("The
comments indicate that the intent of the legislature was to provide this remedy only for
'severely handicapped' persons."); see also, e.g., Cent. Props., 2016-C-1855 at p. 11; 2017
WL 2837152, at *6 ("Although the Official Revision Comments connected with statutes are
not the law, they can be useful in determining legislative intent."); Tracie F., 2015-CJ-1812
at p. 8; 188 So. 3d at 238 ("While the Official Revision Comments are not the law, they may
be helpful in determining the legislative intent.").
158. See, e.g., Chalos & Co. v. Marine Managers, Ltd., No. 14-2441, 2015 WL
6442558, at *7 n.65 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2015) (quoting Wartelle, 97-0744 at p. 9; 704 So. 2d
at 783).
159. In some cases, the courts recognize that the comments are indicative of the intent
of scholars rather than legislators; nevertheless, the comments are heeded. See, e.g., Royal v.

Cook, 2007-CA-1465, p. 7 n.7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/23/08); 984 So. 2d 156, 162 n.7 ("The
'revision comments' . . . are not intended to be considered as part of the law .... Rather,
[they] merely express the commentator's interpretation of how the codal provisions and/or
statutes are to be applied, and are meant to be used as guiding tools for the court." (emphasis
added)); see also Oxley v. Sabine River Auth., 94-1284, p. 19 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/19/95);
663 So. 2d 497, 509 (referring to the "commentator's caution" provided in comment (b) to

Louisiana Civil Code article 1806).
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that it is the comments' role in the legislative process that provides
them with their weight: while they may not have the force of enacted
law, they are especially helpful as interpretative aids given their
relationship to the legislative text.1 60
When characterized as interpretative aids, comments are often
considered alongside other indicia of the law's proper application,
including the legislation's plain meaning, jurisprudence interpreting
and applying the legislative text, and scholarly writing.161 As a tool in

the arsenal of implements of statutory interpretation, comments are
frequently used to bolster the prevailing interpretation of the law.162 In
other cases, comments are found to fall short and are rejected as
erroneous, incomplete, or shortsighted. For example, in Terrebonne
Parish Schoolboard v. Castex Energy, Inc., the Louisiana Supreme
Court rejected the supposition in the comments to Mineral Code
article 122 that mineral lessees owe an implied duty to restore the
surface of the leased premises, finding the comments at odds both
with the legislative text and its interpretative jurisprudence. 163
Likewise, in Savoy v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the Louisiana
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal rejected a statement in Civil Code
article 3461 comment (c) suggesting that peremption may be
suspended by filing of suit or service of process, finding "the non160. See, e.g., Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 2009-0449, p. 5 n.5 (La. 10/20/09);
24 So. 3d 813, 817 n.5 ("While statements contained in the official comments are not part of
the statute and are not binding on courts, they are not discounted entirely, and we find that
they provide some aid in interpreting legislative intent."); Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd. v. Castex

Energy, Inc., 2004-0968, p. 11 (La. 1/19/05); 893 So. 2d 789, 797 ("[Wle note that
statements contained in the official comments are not part of the statute, and are not binding
on this court, although we do not discount them entirely."); see also Anding v. Anding,

37,778-CA, p. 8 n.8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/29/03); 859 So. 2d 901, 905-06 n.8 ("Although the
comments to the code cannot supersede the clear language of a code article, they are often

used for guidance. The lack of a statement [regarding whether revised Civil Code article 938
"changes the law" or "does not change the law"] by the reporter regarding this new article

implies that the question of whether the article changes existing law is an open question.").
161. See, e.g., Curole v. Curole, 2015-CA-0126, 2015 WL 4761420, at *6 (La. App. 4
Cir. Aug. 12, 2015) (considering the comments to Civil Code articles 2358 and 2365 while
construing those articles in pari materia to determine proper construction of article 2365);

Wede v. Niche Mktg. USA, LLC, 2010-0243, pp. 10-11 (La. 11/30/10); 52 So. 3d 60, 66
(citing and quoting from the 1992 revision comments to Civil Code article 3320 to support a
plain meaning interpretation of the article's text); Ogea v. Ogea, 378 So. 2d 984, 989-90 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 1979) (considering the comments to article 187 while also comparing the text to a

prior version of the law to determine legislative intent underlying the same provision).
162. See, e.g., Rebel Distribs. Corp. v. LUBA Workers' Comp., 2013-0749, pp. 20-22
(La. 10/15/13); 144 So. 3d 825, 839-40 (citing and quoting from the comments to Civil Code
article 1881, along with jurisprudence and other sources of legal doctrine, while expounding
on the proper application of the article).

163.

2004-0968 at p. 11; 893 So. 2d at 797.
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authoritative revision comment" to be contrary to the plain language
of article 3461, which states emphatically that "peremption may not
be renounced, interrupted, or suspended."164 In a different case, the
same court noted the limitations of comment (d) to Civil Code article
2541, which may be read to require that a buyer, to prevail in a
redhibitory action against the seller, prove that a defect renders the
property structurally "unsound."65 These cases and others like them
employ sound methods of statutory construction, according to which
the plain language of the text must be given effect without resort to
external interpretative aids when the law, as written, is clear.' Some
of the courts employing this plain meaning approach emphasize that
because the comments are the work of the Law Institute, not the
legislature, they must yield to the statutory text.1 67
Despite the moderate rhetoric that usually surrounds the
comments in judicial opinions, courts occasionally regard comments
with far more import, at times either equating, or conflating, the
comments with the text. In one such case, the Middle District of
Louisiana parsed the text and the comments to Civil Code article
1977 while considering the mechanics of the promesse de portefort.168 After acknowledging that "[tihe object of a contract may be
that a third person will incur an obligation or render a performance,"
the article provides only that "[t]he party who promised that
obligation or performance is liable for damages if the third person
does not bind himself or does not perform."69 The comments go
further, explaining that when the third person expresses consent, the
164. 2008-CA-0182, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/1/08); 993 So. 2d 349, 353 (citing
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3461).

165. Royal v. Cook, 2007-CA-1465, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/23/08); 984 So. 2d
156, 162-63.
166. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 9 (2017) ("When a law is clear and unambiguous and its
application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no

further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature."); Mills v. Davis
Oil Co., 11 F.3d 1298, 1302 (5th Cir. 1994) (refusing to give effect to comment declaring
that a statute "does not change the substance of the law" where "the plain language of the
statute is clear"); Hinchey v. Hinchey, 203 So. 2d 409,416 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1967) ("When an
article is unambiguous, complete in meaning and without need for interpretation, as is LSA-

R.S. 9:301, the comments thereunder are ofno legal significance.").
167. See Savoy, 2008-CA-0182 at pp. 6-7; 993 So. 2d at 353-54 ("It is well-settled that
revision comments to codal articles are not the law but are merely interpretations by the
Louisiana State Law Institute as to how the codal provisions should be applied." (citing

Royal, 2007-CA-1465 at p. 7 n.7; 984 So. 2d at 162 n.7)).
168. Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. Perkins Rowe Assocs., No. 09-497-JJB-SCR, 2010 WL
2838373, at *3 (M.D. La. July 19, 2010). The precise question before the court was whether
the plaintiffs claims could withstand a motion to dismiss. Id.
169. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1977.
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promisor is "released"170 through "substitution."171 Ignoring the
distinction between comment and text, the court phrased the
applicable legal rule thusly: "Until the third party 'substitutes himself
into the original contracting party's shoes by either 'bind[ing] himself
or ... perform[ing],' the original contracting party is liable for any
damages."172 The court then declared that "the plain text of the civil
code indicates performance alone can be enough to release the
original contracting party from liability and substitute the third party
into that role."173 In support of this contention, the court again quoted
from the comments. 17 4
The court's use of the comments to explain the law is not
objectionable; they are, after all, indicative of legislative intent and are
ostensibly grounded both in doctrine and common sense. However,
the court's failure to distinguish between code and comment is
disturbing, as is its reference to the comment as the "plain text" of the
Nowhere does the text state that when a person whose
law.
performance has been promised binds himself to the obligee, the
original obligor is released.175 Thus, to equate this statement with
"plain text" is to imbue it with a weight that it does not deserve.176
In one incredible case, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal went to great lengths to explain why a comment was "law"
equal in force to the text of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. 177
Inquiring into the question of whether peremption is properly pled as
an affirmative defense or peremptory exception, the court looked to
170. Id. cmt. b ("For as long as the third person does not bind himself, the promisor
remains the sole obligor, and as soon as the third person binds himself the promisor is
released.").
171. Id. cmt. c ("The promesse de porte-fort must be distinguished from the
stipulationpour autrui.... In the former, a third person, by expressing his consent, initially
substitutes himself for an intended party to a contract and therefore binds himself.").
172. Keybank, 2010 WL 2838373, at *3 (emphasis added) (quoting LA. CIv. CODE art.
1977).
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id. ("[A]s soon as the third person binds himself the promisor is released."
(quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 1977 cmt. b)).
175. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1977.

176. This is especially so in light of the fact that the statement in the comment that the
original obligor is "released" when the third person binds himself is directly at odds with the
general law of assumption of obligation. According to the plain text of Civil Code article
1821, when a third person agrees to assume the obligation of another, the original obligor is
not released. Id. art. 1821. The court accepted the comment at face value without exploring
this apparent conflict. The author submits that the development and understanding of these
legal institutions would have been better served if the court had done so.
177. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 2006-1140, pp. 20 1-02 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/08); 14 So.
3d 311, 451-52, affd in part, rev'd in part, 2009-0571 (La. 4/1/11); 61 So. 3d 507.
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comment (b) of article 1005 of the Code and determined that,
according to that comment, peremption is not an affirmative
defense.178 To determine the weight of the comment's authority, the
court looked to the enacting legislation and observed that "La. C.C.P.
art. 1005 and Comment (b) are provided for in Section 1 of the Act
and, thus, both are law, unless otherwise provided for in the act in
which it is contained or by some other law."179 To bolster its
conclusion, the court went on to explore the effect of Code of Civil
Procedure article 5057, which provides that headings, source notes,
and cross references found in the Code "do not constitute parts of the
procedural law."180 Remarkably, the court found the omission of
"comments" from this article to be determinative: "The clear and
unambiguous language of Article 5057 does not exclude the
comments in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure from being parts
of the procedurallaw."18

Another jurisprudential phenomenon worth noting is that of
courts applying methods of statutory construction-usually reserved
for exposition of the legislative text-to the comments. 182 For
example, in Tracie F v. FranciscoD., the Louisiana Supreme Court
utilized the maxim expressio unis est exclusio alterius (the expression
of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing) to determine the
proper construction of Civil Code article 131.183 And, in Ogea v.
Ogea, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal utilized an
argument ejusdem generis (of the same kind or nature) to determine
the proper construction of the comment accompanying former Civil
Code article 187.184 Here, the court stated explicitly, "We feel that the
rules on statutory interpretation are also applicable to the
interpretation of Official Revision Comments when the Comments
178. Id.
179. Id. at p. 202; 14 So. 3d at 452. (emphasis omitted).
180. Id. (quoting LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 5057 (2017)).
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 2015-CJ-1812, p. 18 (La. 3/15/16); 188 So. 3d 231,
244; Ogea v. Ogea, 378 So. 2d 984, 989 n. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1979).
183. Tracie F., 2015-CJ-1812 at p. 18; 188 So. 3d at 244 ("Although we are parsing a
legislative comment, rather than a statute itself, by analogy, this principle supports our
interpretation: 'the mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of another thing."'
(quoting State v. La. Riverboat Gaming Comm'n, 94-1872, p. 17 (La. 5/22/95); 644 So. 2d
292, 302)).
184. 378 So. 2d at 989 ("It is a fundamental rule of interpretation that the meaning of a
word or phrase may be ascertained by the meanings of other words or phrases with which it
is associated. Also, when general and specific words are associated with and take color from
one another, the general words are restricted to a sense analogous to the less general.").
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are used to aid the Court in determining the proper legislative
intent."185

Cases expressly equating comments with legislation in so blatant
a manner as those described above are relatively unusual. Far more
frequent are cases that implicitly regard the comments as
authoritative, without explicitly addressing the source or scope of their
influence. Sometimes, the court's failure to question (or even
carefully read) the comments results in grievous error. Thus, in In re
Succession of Martinez, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
accepted without question the statement made in comment (c) to Civil
Code article 1493 (the pre-revised version) that, to qualify as a forced
heir, a child must be "severely disabled" at the time of the decedent's
death.186 This case is remarkable because, at the time it was decided,
the comment had already been amended at the legislature's direction
to remove language indicating that a child must be "severely"
handicapped to qualify as a forced heir. Apparently, the court was
unaware that the change had been made.1 87 More often, a court's
reliance on the comments is innocuous, even beneficial. Regardless
of the outcomes of these cases, they show that even without
consciously exploring the comments' legal status, courts habitually
rely upon them to elucidate the law.
Through their frequent use in the determination of outcomes, the
comments have become nearly as important as the language of the
statutory text. This phenomenon is especially pronounced when the
applicable legislation is terse or the interpretative jurisprudence scant.
In cases such as these, courts out of necessity look to the comments
for guidance that cannot otherwise be readily found. Take, for
example, the jurisprudence interpreting Civil Code article 1479-a
provision recognizing undue influence as a vice of consent whose
presence will result in the nullity of a donation. The article itself
provides only the barest description of the type of influence that leads
to nullity, stating:
A donation inter vivos or mortis causa shall be declared null upon proof
that it is the product of influence by the donee or another person that so

185. Id. at 989 n.3.
186. 98-962, pp. 3-5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/10/99); 729 So. 2d 22,23-24.
187. See In re Succession of Ardoin, 2007-43, p. 8 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/30/07); 957 So.
2d 937, 942-43 ("Although we recognize the complexities raised by the changing
commentary, we conclude that the trial court erred in applying Martinez and the standard
expressed therein.").
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impaired the volition of the donor as to substitute the volition of the
donee or other person for the volition of the donor.188
As the article's comment (a) points out, the doctrine of undue
influence is "new" to Louisiana law.189 Prior to its introduction in
1991, the Civil Code had expressly prohibited the admission of any
proof that a donation had been made "through hatred, anger,
suggestion or capitation"-all rough analogues to modern undue
influence.190 Indeed, undue influence is foreign to the civil law and
comes to Louisiana as a legal transplant-an institution borrowed
from the common law tradition.191 This borrowing and abrupt
reversal in approach were precipitated by the significant erosion of the
law of forced heirship in the early 1990s: as all descendants were no
longer guaranteed a forced share of their ancestors' estates, undue
influence was seen as a means of preventing the disinherison of
capable, adult children who would no longer be entitled to a forced
share of their ancestor's estate. 192
Finding little substance to undue influence in the text of the law
and having no historical cases or foreign civil law doctrine on which
to rely, courts faced with determining whether a donor was unduly
influenced have found it necessary to depend heavily-at times
almost exclusively-upon the comments to provide undue influence
with content.1 93 Courts most typically recite comment (b) to article

188. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479 (2017).
189. Id. cmt. a.
190. Id.; see Laurie Dearman Clark, Comment, Louisiana'sNew Law on Capacity To
Make and Receive Donations: "Unduly Influenced" by the Common Law?, 67 TuL. L. REV.
183, 221-22 (1992); see generally KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE: SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 9.5 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing history of undue
influence in Louisiana).
191. This latter point is revealed by comment (b), which refers to the "common-law
rules" of undue influence. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479 cmt. b; see generally Ronald J. Scalise Jr.,
Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A ComparativeAnalysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L

L. 41 (2008) (discussing the approach of the civil law, and in particular of France and
Germany, to interference with freedom of testation).
192. See John A. Lovett, Love, Loyalty and the Louisiana Civil Code: Rules,
Standards and Hybrid Discretion in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 72 LA. L. REv. 923, 985 (2012);

Scalise, supra note 191, at 82.
193.

Comment (b) notes that the "rules" of undue influence are largely derived from

common law case law and then goes on to provide a summary of those rules occupying
nearly half a page of the "official" printed version of the Code. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479 cmt.
b. Comments (c), (d), and (e) further expound on the parameters of the doctrine, discussing
the requisite intent of the influencer, the time at which undue influence must be operative,
and the distinction between undue influence and error. Id. cmts. c-e. Presumably these
guidelines are, like those in comment (b), based on the common law doctrine of undue
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1479, whether in part or in full, for the proposition that "the objective
aspects of undue influence are generally veiled in secrecy, and the
proof of undue influence is either largely or entirely circumstantial,"
the admonition that "everyone is more or less swayed by associations
with other persons . .. . [t]he more subtle influences, such as creating
resentment toward a natural object of a testator's bounty by false
statements, may constitute the kind of influence that is reprobated by
this Article," and the statement that "[m]ere advice, or persuasion, or
kindness and assistance, should not constitute influence that would
destroy the free agency of a donor and substitute someone else's
volition for his own."94 These oft-cited statements have over time
become the de facto law of undue influence, far more determinative
of legal outcomes than the text of the law.
B.

Comments as Sources ofLegal Rules and Norms

Full appreciation of the comments' significance begins with an
exploration of the way that they are employed by courts, as well as the
rhetoric surrounding their use. It does not, however, end there.
Equally essential is an examination of the ways in which comments
interact with the legislative text. While all comments supplement the
text of the law in some way, they vary in the way that they augment, or
detract from, legislative statements. Appreciating the variety of
comments assists in determining whether comments enrich the law or
lead to its impoverishment.
1.

Exposition of the Text

From the beginning, the principal aim of the Law Institute in
preparing legislative comments has been to contextualize the law.195
Whereas statutory text is crafted as succinctly as possible, comments
allow drafters to provide detailed, narrative explanations for the
influence. However, whether this is the case is not made clear in the comments themselves.
Id.
194. See, e.g., id. cmt. b; In re Succession of Davisson, 50,830, p. 12 (La. App. 2 Cir.
12/22/16); 211 So. 3d 597, 606, writ denied, 2017-0307 (La. 4/7/17); 218 So. 3d 111
(quoting from comment (b) to articulate the type of conduct constituting undue influence); In
re Succession of Cook, 50,111, p. 17 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/16/15); 189 So. 3d 409, 418; In re
Succession of Himel v. Todd, No. 2011 CA 1638, 2012 WL 2921495, at * 4 (La. App. 1 Cir.
7/17/2012) (discussing comments (b), (c), (d), and (e) in depth); In re Succession of Foret,
No. 2010-CA-1038, 2010 WL 5465229, at *4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/2010); see also Petrie v.
Michetti, 10-122, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11); 59 So. 3d 430, 436 (relying upon
comment (b) to differentiate undue influence and duress).
195. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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revisions they propose. Underlying policies and legislative objectives
may be expounded upon at great length. 196 Definitions, often
purposefully omitted from the legislative text, find comfortable
homes in the comments, 197 as do specific examples illustrating the
application of rules stated in general terms.1 98
Perhaps most helpfully, comments serve as legal compasses,
assisting the reader in navigating space and time to understand the
history of the law and its relationship to other provisions and
institutions within the law. In this regard, cross-references are
important navigational tools. They assist in the interpretative task of
reading legislation in pai materia by pointing to provisions that are
closely connected to the statute to which they appertain. 199 In
addition, comments provide a means of explaining the relationship
between the new legislation and the prior law-both the legislation
and its interpretative jurisprudence.200 Comments indicate when prior
cases have been codified 201 or overruled.202 They point out whether an
196. Some discussions of legislative purpose are lengthier than others. See, e.g., LA.
CIv. CODE art. 3515 cmt. b (discussing "[t]he objective" of the choice of law process as a
whole).
197. See, e.g., id. art. 1804 cmt. b (defining the term "virile portion" with reference to
French doctrine). The approach of avoiding definitions in code drafting is summarized by
Portalis thusly: "All that is definition, teaching, doctrine, belongs to the domain of science.
All that is order, rule-properly so called-belongs to the domain of laws." Alain Levasseur,
On the Structure of a Civil Code, 44 TUL. L. REv. 693, 698 (1970) (quoting 6 P.A. FENET,
RECUEiL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 42 (Paris, Marchand du

Breuil 1827) (author's translation)).
198. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 366 cmt. d (providing an example for the general
rule stated in the text that "[1]imited judicial emancipation confers the effects of majority
specified in the judgment of limited emancipation").
199. See, e.g., id. art. 2028 cmt. b 2012 (directing the reader to the definition of "third
person" found in the law of registry to assist in interpreting the text, which states that
simulations may have effects against "third persons"); see also id. art. 13 (requiring laws "be
interpreted in reference to each other").
200. Professor Vernon Palmer has written previously about the methods by which "the
comments attempt to bond the jurisprudence to the new Code." See Vernon V. Palmer, The
Death of a Code-the Birth of a Digest, 63 TUL. L. REv. 221, 260 n.108 (1988). Palmer
identifies six such methods:
(1) to illustrate the scope of a concept or rule; (2) to show the continuity between
the old source article and the new provision; (3) to indicate that a jurisprudential
ruling is the source for a new article; (4) to reject or overrule a line of cases; (5) to
establish an interpretative gloss on the new text; and (6) to establish a counterrule
or exception at variance with the text.
Id. (citations omitted).
201. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2030 cmt. ("[The article] codifies the jurisprudential
rule that a contract which contravenes the public order is absolutely null.").
202. See, e.g., id. art. 1607 cmt. ("To the extent that the rationale of Succession of
Melancon, 330 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1976), would deny that a revocation would
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article is "new" 203 or merely restates past legislation.204 They also
purport to distinguish an article that "does not change the law"205
from one that effects a substantive change 206 as well as from one that
merely "clarifies" the law.207 A declaration of a revision's relationship
to prior legislation and jurisprudence in the comments has become so
commonplace that courts now read significance into the absence of
such a statement. 208
The comments' role in relating legislation to jurisprudence
should not be understated. As was emphasized by the drafters of the
earliest comments, Louisiana's regard for judicial decisions as an
extremely significant, although not binding, source of law nearly
requires that those engaged in substantial law reform explain to the
legislator and the judge how the new law will relate not only to the
text of prior legislation but its prevailing interpretations. Moreover,
given the discursive style of opinions authored by Louisiana judges,
cases themselves often serve as a source of instruction about the law.
It is therefore quite helpful when the comments point to cases whose
discussions may enlighten the lawyer as to the proper meaning of a
occur by a signed and handwritten notation to that effect that did not have a date, that
decision is overruled.").
203. See, e.g., id. art. 2990 cmt. a ("This provision is new.").
204. See, e.g., id. art. 2531 cmt. a ("This Article reproduces the substance of Article
2531 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. It does not change the law."). The distinction
between "new" and "old" provisions is not stark, but graded. According to the comments,
some articles are entirely new, see, e.g., id. art. 2601 cmt. a (noting that the article is "new,"
"changes the law," and departs from prior law, which "require[d] the acceptance to conform
to the terms of the offer"), and others, though new, are based on principles found across
multiple past provisions, see, e.g., id. art. 2019 cmt. a (noting that the article, though new,
restates a principle contained in articles 1899 and 2696 of the Civil Code of 1870). Still
others, though new, reproduce the substance of a single provision, see, e.g., id. art. 2028 cmt.
a (noting that the article, though new, reproduces the substance of article 2239 of the Civil
Code of 1870), and still others do not purport to be new at all, see, e.g., id. art. 2037 (noting
that the article reproduces the substance of articles 1971 and 1985 of the Civil Code of 1870,
and making no reference to the revised article as "new").
205. See, e.g., id. art. 2567 cmt. a ("This Article reproduces the substance of Article
2567 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. It does not change the law.").
206. See, e.g., id. art. 3416 cmt. b ("According to Article 3417 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870, 'peacocks and pigeons are considered as wild fowls, though after every flight
it is their custom to return.' Article 3416 suppresses this rule and thereby changes the law.
There is no reason why peacocks and pigeons should be considered as wild fowl as long as
they have the habit of returning.").
207. See, e.g., id. art. 469 cmt. a ("This provision is new. It clarifies the law."); id. art.
3296 cmt. a ("This Article is new. It clarifies the law.").
208. See, e.g., Anding v. Anding, 37,778-CA, p. 8 n.8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/29/03); 859
So. 2d 901, 905-06 n.8 ("The lack of a statement in this regard by the reporter regarding this
new article implies that the question of whether the article changes existing law is an open
question.").
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revised provision. Even when the comments do not reference cases
explicitly, statements that the revision "changes the law" or "does not
change the law" are particularly useful for determining whether cases
that predate the revision are still relevant or should be disregarded. 209
Comments perform still another orienting function by providing
information about the origin of legal rules. For example, the
comments to Louisiana Civil Code article 477 state that the definition
of ownership provided in that article "follows closely the definition in
the treatise of Planiol."210 In addition, the reader is informed of
"corresponding provisions in modem civil codes," including the codes
of Italy, Greece, Germany, Switzerland, and Qu6bec. 211 Armed with
this information, the comparativist (and presumably the judge) can
now identify foreign historical, doctrinal, and jurisprudential materials
that may aid in her understanding of the revised law.
Comments not only provide roadmaps to civil law institutions,
they also quite frequently address the relationship between the
Louisiana law and its common law analogues. A rule may be
attributed to the common law, signaling that borrowing has
occurred.212 Or the comments may note that a Louisiana rule, while
derived from the civil law, is consistent with the common law
approach.213 In other cases the comments serve a distinguishing
function, making clear that Louisiana law, in its terminology or
approach, quite intentionally departs from the common law.214 In the
latter case, the comments implicitly signal that common law

209.

See, e.g., Videocipher, Div. of Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Satellite Earth

Stations Sese, Inc., No. CV88-2815, 1992 WL 208037, at *3 (W.D. La. July 30, 1992)
(relying on pre-revision jurisprudence to interpret the meaning of "prompt and easy
liquidation" as used in Civil Code article 1902 and noting the article was intended to restate

and clarify the law, not change it); Ward v. Blache, 466 So. 2d 723, 725 n.1 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1985) (noting, while relying on pre-revision jurisprudence, that "the new statute does not
change the law and the Official Comments state that jurisprudence remains relevant").
210. LA. CIV. CODE art. 477 cmt. b.
211. Id. cmt. d.
212. See id. art. 1477 cmt. b (noting that Louisiana's formulation of donative capacity,
"[a]lthough new for Louisiana ... did not spring ex nihil. In many respects it is derived from
the common-law test for testamentary (donative) capacity.").
213. See, e.g., id. art. 1937 cmt. (noting that the rule that a revocable offer is effective
when received is derived from French law but consistent with the common law approach); id.
art. 2502 cmts. b-c (noting that the transfer of rights without warranty is akin to the common

law "quitclaim" deed).
214. See, e.g., id. art. 2524 cmt. c ("The seller's obligation under this Article is not the
common law warranty of fitness. At common law the remedies arising from the warranty of
fitness offer quasi-delictual overtones entirely absent from this Article.") (citations omitted).
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authorities are not appropriate tools for the application and
development of the law.215
Moreover, all of this is done in a didactic manner. Comments,
after all, are drafted not by legislators, but scholars, and aside from
being indicative of the legislature's intent, they are revelatory of the
historical trajectory and conceptual organization of the legal
institutions they describe. They serve two aims in this regard. First,
they are designed to convince the legislator of the wisdom of
proposed reforms, which may involve explaining the pressing need
for a substantive change or reassuring that despite revision there is
nothing new under the sun. And second, they seek to guide lawyers
and judges following the law's enactment. This is done not merely to
benefit the user; legal scholars, and most of all Law Institute
reporters, have a keen interest in directing the law's future
development, whether to achieve desirable policy objectives or simply
to ensure clarity and methodological integrity in the law.
One particularly representative example of the expository
function of the comments are those accompanying the 2008 revisions
of Civil Code article 466.216 The article sets forth the definition of
"component parts of a building or other construction"--a matter of
fundamental importance in Louisiana property law and a subject that
has been in a state of flux for several decades, having been first
enacted in 1978, amended in 2005 and 2006, and again revised in
2008.217 The 2008 revision comments accompanying the reforms are
lengthy, consisting of nearly two pages of printed text. 218 First,
comment (a) appropriately orients the law in time, explaining its
relation to past law with extensive and helpful references to both
jurisprudence and doctrine:
This Article represents a fresh start in an area of law that has been the
focus of extensive academic and jurisprudential debate. Cf. WillisKnighton Medical Center v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales and Use Tax
215.

See, e.g., id. art. 797 cmt. c (noting that "[o]wnership in indivision is the only

type of co-ownership" and stating affirmatively that "[j]oint tenures and the common law
doctrine of estates are not recognized in Louisiana").
216.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 466 cmts. (2008).

217. See Act No. 632, 2008 La. Acts 2573; Act No. 765, 2006 La. Acts 2693; Act No.
301, 2005 La. Acts 1772; Act No. 728, 1978 La. Acts 1900; see generally John A. Lovett,
Another Great Debate?: The Ambiguous Relationship Between the Revised Civil Code and
Pre-RevisionJurisprudenceas Seen Through the Prytania Park Controversy, 48 Loy. L. REv.
615 (2002) (providing an excellent discussion of the historical trajectory of the law of
component parts).
218. LA. CIV. CODE art. 466 cmts. a-i 2008.

HIDDENLAW

2017]

309

Commission, 903 So. 2d 1071 (La. 2005) and PrytaniaParkHotel Ltd.
v. General Star Indemnity Co., 179 E3d 169 (5th Cir. 1999) with
Equibank v United States Internal Revenue Service, 749 E 2d 1176
(5th Cir. 1985) and LaFleurv. Foret, 213 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3 Cir.
1968). See John A. Lovett, Another Great Debate?: The Ambiguous
Relationship Between the Revised Civil Code and Pre-Revision
Jurisprudence as Seen Through the Prytania Park Controversy, 48 Loy.
L. J. 615 (2002); A. N. Yiannopoulos, Of Immovables, Component
Parts, Societal Expectations and the Forehead of Zeus, 60 La. L. Rev.
1379 (2000); A. N. Yiannopoulos, Property § 142.5, 2 La. Civil Law
Treatise (4th Ed. 2001). Prior jurisprudence remains relevant only to
the extent that it employs principles consistent with those provided
under this Article. 219
The remaining comments-(b) through (i)-all seek to elucidate the
law, with frequent references to past legislation, doctrine, and
jurisprudence. Comment (b) discusses the "substantial damage" test,
noting that it is "carried forward from the prior Article without change
in the law."220 Comment (c) makes the case that civil law doctrine
supports the notion that loosely attached things may serve as
component parts of a building "even though substantial damage
would not result from their removal."221 Comment (d) provides a
cross-reference to Civil Code article 4, which refers to "prevailing
usages," a concept upon which the societal expectations test is built. 2 22
Examples of the proper application of the rules are provided in
comments (e) and (g). 2 23 Comment (f) provides detailed analysis of
the prior cases, 224 while comment (h) discusses the meaning of
"physical attachment."225 A final comment (i) addresses the scope of
the article as it pertains to immovables only, with several crossreferences to guide the reader.226 These comments do not provide an
exhaustive discourse on the institution of component parts. 227
However, they do provide numerous references with which the lawyer,
judge, or aspiring scholar may chart a course through this challenging
area of the law.
219. Id. cmt. a.
220. Id cmt. b.
221.

Id. cmt. c.

222. Id cmt. d.
223. Id. cmts. e, g.
224. Id. cmt. f.
225.

Id. cmt. h.

226. Id. cmt. i.
227. Indeed, no revision comments could ever accomplish such a herculean task,
given the complexity of this area of the law.
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Extension of the Text

While the majority of legislative comments are committed to
exposition, many comments do much more than simply contextualize
the law. Comments may also extend or complement the law by
grafting on substantive content that is not found in the text.
Comments of this sort act as gap-fillers, suggesting solutions to legal
problems that did not make their way into the text and making explicit
various connections to which the text points only implicitly, if at all.
Opening the Civil Code to the first articles of the Preliminary
Title reveals comments of this type. Article 1 announces that, in
Louisiana, "[t]he sources of law are legislation and custom." 22 8

Articles 2 through 4 go on to define legislation and custom and
provide that, in the event of a gap in the law, the court must "proceed
according to equity." 229 Nowhere in the text are secondary,
nonbinding sources of law addressed. Also not discussed are sources
of law superior to legislation. Instead, this more comprehensive
treatment of the theory of sources of law is relegated to the comments,
which address the relationship of the enumerated sources to
jurisprudence and doctrine, as well as the state constitution, federal
law, and international treaties.230
The comments accompanying Civil Code article 1479's
recognition of undue influence also readily exemplify the expansive
power of comments. As discussed above, the text of the article is
scant, consisting only of a single sentence recognizing the nullity of a
donation procured through influence "that so impaired the volition of
the donor as to substitute the volition of the donee ...

for the volition

of the donor." 23 1 The article reveals none of the complexity
surrounding the doctrine of undue influence nor of the legislative
intent behind its introduction into the law. Moreover, it is the
comments, not the legislative text, that perform the labor of
incorporating the common law doctrine (and common law
terminology) of undue influence into Louisiana law.232
Yet another example of a comment extending the law is found in
the law of Obligations in General. Civil Code article 1803 addresses
228.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 1.

229. Id. arts. 2-4.
230. Id. art. 1 cmts. b, d.
231.

Id. art. 1479.

232. See id. cmt. b (summarizing the subjective elements of undue influence found in
common law cases and instructions to juries and using the phrase "natural object of a
testator's bounty," which is not found in the Civil Code).
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the effect of remission of debt by an obligee in favor of one of several
solidary obligors. 233 According to the article, a remission "benefits
the other solidary obligors in the amount of the portion of that
obligor."234 The comment goes on to provide a rule that the article
does not: "In case of insolvency of a solidary obligor after the obligee
has remitted the debt in favor of another, the loss must be borne by the
obligee."2 3 5 Thus, again, the comment supplies a rule that is neither

expressly provided by nor readily apparent from the legislative text.
3.

Subversion of the Text

A third variety of comments, like those that expand the
legislation, provides rules and distinctions that are not stated in the
legislative text. However, unlike the comments described above, this
third type of comment subverts the legislation, espousing counterrules and exceptions that are directly contrary to the legislative text.
Quite often, the uncodified counter-rule is sourced in
jurisprudence. For example, comment (b) to Civil Code article 1837
provides a rule in direct contravention of the text of the law. Found
within the chapter on Proof of Obligations, article 1837 defines the
act under private signature.236 The text provides that "[a]n act under
private signature need not be written by the parties, but must be
signed by them." 23 7 The plural form of the last word of the provision

clearly suggests that if the act is multilateral, then all parties must
affix their signatures to the act. Nevertheless, comment (b) provides
quite the opposite, stating:
This Article is not intended to change the jurisprudential rule that an act
under private signature is valid even though signed by one party alone,
when the party who signed it asserts the validity of a commutative
contract contained in the writing against a party who did not sign it but
whose conduct reveals that he has availed himself of the contract. 238
The comment goes on to cite six cases supporting this counter-textual
position.239
233. Id. art. 1803.
234. Id.
235. Id. cmt. d. This rule may be viewed as counter-textual rather than merely an
extension of the law when contrasted with the affirmative statement found in Civil Code
article 1806 that the loss "must be borne by the other solidary obligors in proportion to their
portion." Id. art. 1806.
236. Id. art. 1837.
237. Id. (emphasis added).
238. Id. cmt. b.
239. Id.
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Another example of comments contradicting text appears in the
comments addressing the law of error. Civil Code article 1949 sets
forth a single framework for determining whether error vitiates
consent.240 According to that article, consent is vitiated only when
two criteria are met: "Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a
cause without which the obligation would not have been incurred and
that cause was known or should have been known to the other
party." 241 The comments, on the other hand, do not approach error as
a unitary entity but instead distinguish between bilateral and unilateral
error. In the case of the former, comment (d) instructs:
The granting of relief for error presents no problem when both parties
are in error, that is, when the error is bilateral. When that is the case the
contract may be rescinded, as when the parties misunderstood each
other at the time of contracting or when they were misinformed because
of the error of a third party. As an alternative, the instrument that
contains the contract may be reformed in order to reflect the true intent
of the parties. 242
The comment goes on to explain that it is only when the error is
unilateralthat courts resist granting relief because "granting relief to
the party in error will unjustly injure the interest of the other party if
he is innocent of the error." 243 The comment continues, quoting from
a pre-revision case: "The jurisprudence . . . establishes that a contract
may be invalidated for unilateral error as to a fact which was a
principal cause for making the contract, where the other party knew or
should have known it was the principal cause." 244 The comment thus
suggests, albeit indirectly, that the criteria for relief articulated by the
text of article 1949 are applicable in cases of unilateral error only,
even though this distinction, seemingly fundamental, is never made in
the text.
Language in the comments addressing the effects of error also
contain counter-textual rules. According to the legislative text, when
error vitiates consent, the contract is considered relatively null-a
designation that usually leads to rescission of the contract upon the
request of the party in error.245 There are, however, several recognized
exceptions to this general rule of rescission. First, "[a] party may not
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. art 1949.
Id.
Id. cmt. d (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Nugent v. Stanley, 336 So. 2d 1058, 1063 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1976)).
See id. arts. 2031, 2033.
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avail himself of his error if the other party is willing to perform the
contract as intended by the party in error." 246 Second, "[t]he court
may refuse rescission when the effective protection of the other party's
interest requires that the contract be upheld." 247 A third exception
appears not in the text of the law but in the comments to article 1952.
Comment (d) provides that, "[i]n determining whether to grant
rescission or, when rescission is granted, whether to allow any
recovery to the party not in error, the court may consider whether the
error was excusable or inexcusable."248 Comment (d) goes on to state
that the doctrine of inexcusable error enjoys ample support in
continental civilian doctrine and in Louisiana jurisprudence.249 There
is no question that a limitation on rescission for inexcusable errors is
both sensible and well-established; however, despite its firm hold
within the broader doctrine of error, "inexcusable" error did not make
its way into the text of the law.250
Before leaving this topic of the comments' relationship to the
text, it must be admitted that the line between an expository comment
and one that extends the law is a thin one, as is that between an
extending comment and one that subverts the text. It is not a goal of
this Article to identify with precision the contours of these three
categories of comments.
Rather, fluidity between exposition,
extension, and subversion illustrates that comments, that appear to
provide innocuous explanation of the law may easily introduce into
the statutory compilation a layer of rules and counter-rules that must
be harmonized with the text in the same manner as other statutory
enactments.
IV. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CRITIQUES OF THE COMMENTS

It can no longer be denied that comments are an authoritative
source of legal rules and norms, one that is carefully cultivated by the
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 1951.
art. 1952.
cmt. d.
(citing Watson v. Planter's Bank of Tenn., 22 La. Ann. 14 (1870); JACQUES

GHESTIN, LA NOTION D'ERREUR DANS LE DROIT POSITIF ACTUEL 146-65 (1963); Saul Litvinoff,

"Error" in the Civil Law, in ESSAYS ON THE CIvIL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 222, 226-69 (Joseph
Dainow ed., 1969); 6 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRArtF PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVL

FRANCAIS 227-29 (Paul Esmein ed., 2d ed. 1952)).
250. Id. This is so despite the fact that the remainder of the same comment is
dedicated to addressing an exception that was clearly codified: the court's discretion to
consider whether the party not in error suffered a detrimental change in position that militates
against rescission of the contract. Id.
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Law Institute and legislature and which courts rely upon and
implicitly trust. Moreover, it is clear that comments, though not law,
provide a vast infrastructural system for legislation. Comments
contextualize legislation, ease its integration into the existing legal
fabric, and guide its application and development. They fill gaps and
make connections between legislated rules. They preserve uncodified
exceptions to and variations on statutory rules when the text is not
sufficiently nuanced.
Astonishingly, this has come to be the state of affairs without any
serious debate regarding the propriety of this outcome. Historically,
Louisiana scholars envisioned a cost-benefit analysis for the
comments, whereby their perceived departure from traditional civilian
code methodology was outweighed by their practical use. However,
to date this cost-benefit analysis has been lacking. In truth, neither
the theoretical nor practical shortcomings of the comments have ever
been fully recognized. For the widespread and pervasive reliance
upon comments to be defensible, this calculus must be complete.
A.

TheoreticalConsiderations

Louisiana jurists tend to view comments as benign, even
beneficial addenda to the text of the law. However, an examination of
the shortcomings of the comments reveals that the drafting and
publication of comments comes at a cost of some measure to our
ideals: codification in the civilian style, the democratic legitimacy of
legislation, and the transparency and accessibility of law. While these
costs are not insurmountable, they must be recognized and examined.
1.

Ideal Codification

Since the publication of the comments to the Louisiana Criminal
Code, Louisiana scholars have lamented that the publication of
comments alongside the law deviates significantly from accepted
civilian drafting techniques.251 In civil law jurisdictions, legislation is
typically drafted and promulgated without accompanying
comments. 252 This is not to say that commentaries are not prepared
during the revision process; rather, quite often the principal drafter of
the projet prepares an extensive exposd des motifs to explain and
251.

See Morrow, supra note 27,

at 498; see also supra notes 42-43 and

accompanying text (discussing the perceived deviation from civilian drafting techniques).
252.

See Yiannopoulos, supra note 54, at 406; see also Zengel, supra note 41, at 959

(noting "the use of comments in a civilian code is extraordinary").
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contextualize proposed reforms for legislators and, if the projet is
adopted, the bench and bar. 253 However, these works, though
presented to the legislature, are published in treatises and
monographs, not in official compilations of the law. 254 This
seemingly narrow distinction has been viewed as substantial by critics
of Louisiana's practice.255
The civil law tradition's separation of law and commentary is
deliberate; it furthers the goals of codification as a legal methodology.
Fundamentally, a civil code should consist of clear, concise statements
of law.256 The aim is not to legislate individual cases within the code
itself, but to lay down general principles that may be later employed
by the judge and the jurist to find solutions to specific disputes.257 In
part, brevity of expression ensures the simplicity and elegance of the
code, which should in theory be accessible by all members of a
society and not merely the trained legal elite.258

Even before considering the problems posed by the contents of
comments, recognition must be given to the fact that their very
volume stands in the way of ideal codification. The practice in
Louisiana of printing revision comments in official compilations of
law adds considerably to the length and complexity of the text"outrageously" so, according to one scholar, who observed, "The
revised code should not be a textbook."259 And, while experienced
attorneys and scholars may find the comments instructive, their
detailed references to jurisprudence, prior legislation, doctrinal
theories, and other legal institutions do little to elucidate the law for
the layperson or inexperienced lawyer. More concerning, many
comments contain so many oblique references to prior law and
outmoded legal institutions that even seasoned legal experts find them
difficult to decipher.
Generality of expression not only ensures the code's aesthetic
appeal, it serves functional aims as well. Excessive detail undermines
253. See Morrow, supra note 27, at 498.
254. Yiannopoulos, supra note 54, at 406; see also Zengel, supra note 41, at 961
(stating comments "should be published separately as doctrinal writings").
255. See Morrow, supra note 27, at 498; Yiannopoulos, supra note 54, at 406; Zengel,
supra note 41, at 961.

256. Levasseur, supra note 197, at 697-98.
257.

Jean Louis Bergel, PrincipalFeaturesand Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L.

REv. 1073, 1082 (1988).
258.

(1955).

See Ferdinand Fairfax Stone, A Primeron Codification, 29 TUL. L. REV. 303, 307

It should be mentioned that although this may be viewed as a recognizable aim of

codification in the French tradition, it is not universal in the civil law world.
259. Zengel, supra note 41, at 960.
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the code by anchoring it to particular social circumstances; as a
society evolves, detailed provisions may become outdated and
eventually obsolete.
Moreover, law that prescribes outcomes
hamstrings judicial creativity, preventing the judge from adapting the
law to circumstances that were unforeseen at the time the law was
drafted.2 60 Generality also must be understood in relation to another
hallmark of a civil code's design: systematization.261 While individual
provisions may be sparse, they are not designed to be read in isolation.
Instead, the judge is to read the civil code as a single statutory
enactment, assembling solutions to legal disputes by pulling
principles from across the whole of the law.2 62
When comments are appended to the text in official
publications, they anchor the law in a way that undermines these
functional aims of generality. Comments frequently provide specific
examples of the law's proper application. Given that judges are so
heavily influenced by the comments, these examples pose nearly the
same risk of rendering the law obsolete as if they were written into the
text. And, as comments are generally retrospective, focusing on past
legislation, past jurisprudence, and past doctrinal exposition, they
may discourage judicial innovation as social needs evolve.
Moreover, the provision of solutions in the comments
disincentives the vital civil law technique of solving problems by
reasoning across the whole of the law. Terse cross-references to other
provisions of law contribute to this problem. While they may provide
a good starting point for textual analysis, these references are
necessarily incomplete; even lengthy comments cannot effectively
reveal the interrelationship between a single provision and all other
related articles. As a result, lawyers and judges relying on the
comments may be less inclined to explore for, or have confidence in,
more creative, more nuanced, and perhaps even more accurate
solutions to the problems before them.
According to some Louisiana civil law scholars, the most salient
feature of an ideal civil code is its comprehensive nature. As
articulated by Yiannopoulos, "Civil codes are conceived as
comprehensive enactments, designed to be complete within their area
of application, and intended to break with the past." 263 The inclusion
260.

See Bergel, supra note 257, at 1082-83.

261. See id. at 1083.
262. See id.
263. A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, in LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE,
supra note 96, at LI, LVI.
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of revision comments in the Louisiana Civil Code undeniably
prevents it from attaining this ideal. Lawyers and judges are all but
compelled to consult the comments given their physical proximity to
the text. The comments then point the reader to other subsidiary
sources of law: repealed or suppressed legislation, legal doctrine, and
jurisprudence. 264 Indeed, as Professor Vernon Palmer has aptly
observed, "[O]ne cannot know the 'Code' without reading the
comments, and then one must read the sources that the comments say
to read."265
However, while the use of comments may seem at odds with the
archetypal code, the ideals of codification should not be overstated,
nor should the conflict between comments and codification be unduly
problematized. 26 6 Although the practice of publishing comments
thwarts
perfect
clarity,
generality,
systematization,
and
comprehensiveness, no civil code lives up entirely to these ideals. 267
Indeed, despite the rhetoric of codification, the modern civil law
recognizes that codes are not designed to exist in legal vacuums in
which prior legislation and subsidiary sources of law are entirely
ignored, or a world in which legal problems are solved with the code
and logic alone.268 The persistence of legal norms arising from
uncodified statutes, jurisprudence, and legal doctrine is inevitable, if
not also desirable. 269
Louisiana's status as a mixed jurisdiction provides additional
justification for departing from puritan civilian drafting principles to
allow the inclusion of the comments. As the drafters of the Louisiana
codes have long understood, judicial reliance on jurisprudence
necessitates explanations of the relationship between the prior
jurisprudence and the new law. While reliance on the comments may
be somewhat incongruous with Louisiana's theory of sources of law,
if suddenly the comments were no longer included alongside revisions
of the law, this omission would do little to curb courts' overreliance on
264. See Palmer, supra note 200, at 253-55.

265. Id. at 255.
266. See, e.g., Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Civil Code of Louisiana Is Alive and Well, 64
TUL. L. REv. 147, 166-67 (1989) (refuting Professor Palmer's theory that reliance on
jurisprudence and revision comments has produced two codes).
267.

Moreover, these ideals of codification do not apply equally to every code. For

example, the German Civil Code is far less general and abstract than the French Code civil.
See Hein K6tz, Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously, 50 MOD. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1987).
268. See id at 11; Cueto-Rua, supra note 266, at 166-67.
269. See K6tz, supra note 267, at 11 ("Indeed all codes, partly from age, partly from
the intention of their draftsmen, partly from mere oversight, leave wide gaps which cannot be
filled by the available statutory rules.").
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case law. Indeed, such a change of course may even increase reliance
on jurisprudence because, without comments, the judge would often
have no explanation of the proper interpretation of the law.
Moreover, while the official publication of comments is not the
norm in the civil law tradition, Louisiana is not entirely alone in this
practice. For example, the Argentinian C6digo Civil, which became
effective in 1871, contained extensive comments-referred to as
"notes"--authored by its principal drafter, Dalmacio V6lez
Sarsfield. 270 These notes provide information regarding the sources
from which the provisions of the Civil Code were drawn,271 as well as
expository discussions of the Roman law and its various
interpretations.272 As early as the beginning of the twentieth century,
Sarsfield's notes were reportedly regarded as "the most abundant
source of help to judges, and practitioners for the study of the
code." 273 While Argentina's tradition of comments promulgated
alongside the text of the law endured for nearly 150 years, it has
recently come to an end; in 2015, Argentina enacted a new civil and
commercial code, the C6digo Civil y Commercial de la Naci6n,
which is devoid of explanatory notes.274
More recently, the 1993 revision of the Civil Code of Quebec
was accompanied by official comments prepared and published by the
Ministbre de la Justice.275 As in Louisiana, pressure from the legal
community in Qu6bec prompted the publication of an "official"
commentary to accompany the Code. 2 76 The official status of the
commentaries in Qu&bec is similar to that of Louisiana's legislative
comments-not law, but merely interpretative aids.2 77 However, as to
270.

See generally C6DIGO CIVIL [COD. CIVIL] [CIV. CODE] (J. Lajoune & Cia. eds.,

1939) (Arg.); Phanor James Eder, The Argentine Civil Code, 1 A.B.A. J. 91, 94-96 (1915)
(describing the Sarsfield's work).
271.
272.
273.

See, e.g., COD. CIVIL art. 1 note.
See, e.g., id. art. 3 note.
Eder, supra note 270, at 101.

274.

C6DIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACION [COD. CIV. Y COM.] [CIVIL AND

COMMERCE CODE] (2015) (Arg.).
275.

See MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE, COMMENTAIRES DU MNISTRE DE LA JUSTICE: LE

CODE CIVIL DU QUEBEC (Publications du Qu6bec ed., 1993).
276. See Pierre Legrand, Codification and the Politics ofExclusion: A Challengefor
Comparativists,31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 799, 802 (1998).

277.

As articulated by a 1997 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada:

Of course, the interpretation of the Civil Code must be based first and foremost on
the wording of its provisions. That said, however, and as noted by Baudouin J.A. in

the judgment under appeal, there is no reason to systematically disregard the
Minister's commentaries, since they can sometimes be helpful in determining the
legislature's intention, especially where the wording of the article is open to
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be expected, the unofficial story may be more complex: as is the case
in Louisiana, some scholars are critical of the comments. 278
Although beyond the scope of this Article, detailed comparative
analysis of the Argentinian and Qu6b6cois experiences with legislative
comments is vital to an understanding of the relationship between
comments and civil codes, as is further study of comments and other
scholarly writings, official or otherwise, in other civil law
jurisdictions. One would expect to observe variety among the ways
that comments, exposis des motifs, and other scholarly commentaries
on legal enactments are made and published. An examination of this
variety may enable the development of drafting and publication
techniques that safeguard against the deterioration of codes.
Moreover, comparative study should focus on the use of comments
and similar materials by courts, lawyers, and scholars, as well as the
deference they are afforded vis-d-vis other sources of law.
Observation of the law in action should provide further insight into
the extent to which the ideals of codification are honored or breached
in their application. This insight in turn can inform a realistic
assessment of whether the threats posed by comments to civilian
methodology are more imagined than real.
For the present, it is sufficient to observe that even while the
archetypal code may be out of reach-for any civil law jurisdiction,
and even more so for Louisiana-the ideals of codification remain
sound drafting principles that should generally be honored.279 And
while neither the publication of the comments nor their use by courts
constitutes a crisis-methodological or otherwise-if this
supplemental source of law and its relationship to codified law is not
well understood and carefully managed, then its proliferation may
have unintended consequences for the Civil Code. As stewards of the
civil law tradition, Louisiana lawyers, judges, and scholars have a
responsibility not only to appreciate legislative comments but to

differing interpretations. However, the commentaries are not an absolute authority.
They are not binding on the courts, and their weight can vary, inter alia in light of
other factors that may assist in interpreting the Civil Code's provisions.
Dor6 v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, 873 (Can.) (citation omitted); see St6phane
Beaulac, ParliamentaryDebates in Statutory Interpretation:A Question of Admissibility or
of Weight?, 43 McGLL L.J. 287, 308 (1998).
278. See, e.g., John E.C. Brierley, Preface, 39 McGLL L.J. 743, 745 (1994)
(discussing the "ambiguous status" attaching to the "official" comments, which "render the
distinction between existing law and innovation often obscure").
279. See Zengel, supra note 41, at 960 n.81.
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carefully curate them, so that those consequences may be anticipated
and minimized.
2.

Legislative Integrity and Democratic Legitimacy

While Louisiana scholars have long recognized the threats posed
by comments to the Civil Code, less attention has been given to a
more fundamental concern: the comments' capacity to undermine the
very ideal of legislative integrity. While this concern is related to the
comments' effect on codified law, it is conceptually distinct and
should be independently explored.
First, comments pose a threat to Louisiana's source-ranking
system. Louisiana, like other civil law jurisdictions, articulates a
theory of sources of law according to which the designation of
binding "law" is restricted to the constitution, legislation, and
custom. 2 80 Other legal sources-jurisprudence, doctrine, usages, and
equity-are relegated to the status of secondary, nonbinding
authorities.281 In a conflict between the sources, it is legislation, not
doctrine, that should prevail. Our experience with the comments
reveals that on occasion Louisiana courts improperly elevate the
comments to the level of the legislative text. While explicit disregard
for the source hierarchy is rare, the existence of counter-textual
comments is not, and each instance of counter-textualism appears to
violate the theory of sources.
More generally, when considering the relationship between
comments and legislation, it becomes clear that as a practical matter,
the comments occupy undefined territory, an interstice in our sourceranking regime. Officially, comments are a form of legal doctrineexpositions drafted by legal scholars. They are expressly not law, as
the legislature has repeatedly denied their force as legislation. And
yet, their making and promulgation suggest that that they do carry
some legislative authority. Perhaps more troubling is the fact that,
unlike members of the legislature or even the judiciary, members of

280. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 cmt. b (2017) ("According to civilian doctrine, legislation
and custom are authoritative or primary sources of law."). Comment (d) acknowledges that
while article 1 references only "legislation" and "custom," making no reference to
constitutional law, federal legislation, executive orders, international treaties, and the
Louisiana Constitution, those sources of law are "the prius of all Louisiana legislation and
need not be mentioned in Article 1 of the Civil Code."). Id. cmt. d.
281. Id. cmt. b (contrasting primary sources with "persuasive or secondary sources of
law, such as jurisprudence, doctrine, conventional usages, and equity, that may guide the
court in reaching a decision in the absence of legislation and custom").

20 17]

HIDDENLAW

32 1

the Law Institute are not elected and thus not democratically
accountable to the people governed by the laws (and comments) that
they draft.
Thus far, legitimacy concerns have largely been ignored by
Louisiana scholars, who have focused exclusively on the threat of the
comments to Louisiana's codified system of law. Nevertheless, the
threat posed by comments to the legislative process should not be
understated. Comments accompany many statutory enactments that
exist outside of the Civil Code. Are these comments exempt from
criticism because they do not concern a "code" in the civilian sense?
Regardless of the form that legislation takes, if comments obscure,
expand, or contradict the law, the will of a small group of Louisiana's
legal elite is allowed to obscure that of the elected legislature.
The authenticity of this concern is confirmed through
comparative analysis focused on the common law. In the United
States, comments accompany many sources of legislation, including
the Uniform Commercial Code, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Addressing these forms of
commentary, American scholars have expressed concern that the
comments are formed outside of the democratic processes established
for legislation and routinely expand on or restrict the meaning of the
text. 2 82 Of particular concern is the fact that comments lack the
constitutional safeguards that exist to ensure the legitimacy of law.283
Without democratic accountability, it is feared that drafters will fall
victim to political pressures and personal biases.284
Like concerns surrounding the ideals of codification, doubts
regarding the legitimacy of comments should not be inflated. It may
be that Louisiana's practice of passing comments before the
legislature within the bills to which they appertain lessens any
concern that they are drafted by a small group of unelected citizens
rather than by the legislature. After all, the legislature not only
reviews the comments, it has on at least a few occasions shown that it
is willing to exercise some oversight of their content. Moreover, the
Law Institute is an official state agency, tasked with authority to
oversee the coordination of the law. While its membership may be
appointed rather than elected, legitimacy concerns here are arguably
less than are regularly tolerated with respect to state and federal
&

282. See, e.g., Nigel Stark, Note, Unofficial Official Comments, 11 TEX. REV. L.
POL. 479,480-81 (2007).
283. See id. at 488-89.
284. See id. at 493.
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agency rulemaking. On the other hand, it must be remembered that in
most cases, the legislature does not permit revision of the comments
during the legislative process and affords wide latitude to the Law
Institute to revise comments following the law's enactment. Within
this reality, apprehension that the writings of a few elite scholars may
undercut the legislative will should not be discounted as formalism.
One final solace is the recognition that law, at least in the living,
applied sense, is never made by the legislature alone but is instead
fashioned through interaction between legislators, the judiciary,
scholars, and private actors. 285 And while legislative text may trump
subsidiary sources in a contest of rank, one can never predict how the
law will be applied without familiarity with secondary texts and
historical context. 286 Said another way, doctrine always has been and
will continue to be vital to the understanding and sensible application
of law-and to a large extent, whether that doctrine takes the form of
legislative comments is immaterial.
3.

Accessibility and Transparency

Comments suffer yet another problem of legitimacy distinct
from the identity of their drafters: neither the process of their making
nor their publication is entirely transparent. Few practitioners and
judges are fully aware of the process by which comments are made,
published, and revised. And, with rare exceptions, the identity of the
drafters of comments is not well known, as the comments are not
attributed to individuals, but to the Law Institute as a whole. 2 8 7
Moreover, although comments are printed in both official and
unofficial publications of the law, they are not readily available for
public viewing on the legislature's website. A search using the
Louisiana legislature's "Louisiana Law Search" page yields only the
text of the law, not the comments. 288 Comments do appear in acts of
the legislature, available on the legislature's "Bills Search" page. 2 89
However, reading entire bills to find the comments to a single
285.

See Jan Smits & Caroline Colomme, The Reform of the French Law of

Obligations, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. COMP. L. 1040, 1049 (2016).

286. Id.
287. This is not without exception: in 1942, the legislature requested that the drafters
of the Criminal Code be recognized for their preparation of the comments. See S. Con. Res.
12, 1942 Leg., 11th Reg. Sess. (La. 1942).
288.

See Search LouisianaLaws, LA. ST. LEGISLATURE, http://www.legis.1a.gov/legis/

LawSearch.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).
289. See Bill Search, LA. ST. LEGISLATURE, http://www.legis.1a.gov/legis/BillSearch.
aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).
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provision is not only time consuming and difficult, it is also futile
given the Law Institute's authority to revise comments after enactment
and the frequency with which it does so. 290 The practical
consequence of this state of affairs is that the public, to access
comments, must rely on sources of legislation prepared by
commercial publishers.
Nevertheless, the issue of accessibility is perhaps the least
worrying drawback of the comments. For one thing, while the Law
Institute's procedures may not be well known in the legal community
or by the public, they are hardly secret. The Law Institute is, after all,
a public body which is subject to both the Louisiana Open Meetings
Law and the Public Records Law.29 1 As a result, all meetings of the
Law Institute (both committee meetings and meetings of the Council)
are noticed and open to the public. In addition, all Law Institute
materials and records may be accessed through the making of public
records requests. While the identities of reporters are not given in
official publications of the law, they are readily ascertainable through
inquiry to the Law Institute and are even listed on the Law Institute's
own website, as are the identities of all committee members and
members of the Council. 292 Moreover, given the Law Institute's
institutional review and endorsement of draft legislation and
comments, the association of comments with individual reporters is
arguably unnecessary, if not misleading.
However, while transparency concerns about the comments may
be minimal, the importance of comments in the day-to-day practice of
law and the resolution of legal disputes warrants consideration of
whether comments should be more prominently recognized and
promoted as a source of law and, if so, how that might be
accomplished. The Law Institute, the legislature, and even legal
publishers have a role to play in ensuring the comments and the
process of their making is as accessible as any other source of written
law.

290. As is discussed herein, comments are often revised extensively prior to
publication. See discussionsupra Part. I.B.3.

291. LA. REV. STAT.

§ 24:202(G) (2017).

292. See Council Members, LA. ST. L. INST., http://www.lsli.org/council-members
(last visited Sept. 2, 2017); Committees, supra note 69.
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PracticalShortcomings

Throughout their history, the comments have been justified by
their practical advantages. Revision comments have great potential to
assist practitioners and judges in their understanding and application
of law, particularly when revisions are extensive. Students, too, may
benefit from their guidance. However, this promise of the comments
is not always achieved. No formal standards govern the drafting of
comments, and as a result comments are inconsistent in their style and
quality. Once they are published, comments are usually not revised,
and as a result many comments have become stale or even inaccurate
over time. Our occasional neglect of the comments has resulted in
errors, inconsistencies, and historical anachronisms, all of which both
undermine the purpose of the comments and prevent their practical
utility from counterbalancing their philosophical costs. Lamentably,
our reliance on the comments at times even impedes the quality of the
law-both the legislative text as it is drafted and the development of
the law through its application by the courts.
1.

Imperfections in the Comments

The principal purpose of the legislative comments is to elucidate
the law-explain the relationship between past and present, point to
jurisprudential examples of codified rules, and provide examples of
the proper application of the text. While many comments perform
these functions flawlessly, many others fall short of these objectives.
Distressingly, comments are too often incorrect in an objective sense,
citing cases for principles they do not contain, misstating the historical
course of the law, or wrongly stating that a revision does or does not
change the law. Inaccurate comments such as these muddy the legal
waters and create interpretative problems where the text, standing
alone, would not. While comprehensive itemization of erroneous
comments is beyond the scope of this work, a sampling of
inaccuracies illustrates the variety of the flaws.
First, some comments are facially inaccurate, articulating
principles without support in the law and citing cases to support
propositions for which they do not stand. Take for example comment
(b) to Civil Code article 2628. This comment states that "[a] right of
first refusal or an option to buy for a perpetual or indefinite term is
null" and cites several cases in support of this proposition.293 The
293.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 2628 cmt. b (2017).
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cases support the nullity of a perpetual or indefinite option; however,
none of the cited cases supports the application of that rule to rights of
first refusal.294 While an argument may be made that both legal
certainty and the policy against keeping property out of commerce
militate in favor of extending the rule beyond options to other
agreements preparatory to a sale, the fact remains that despite the
dogmatic statement in the comments, neither the text of the Civil
Code nor its interpretative jurisprudence requires this result.295
Other comments, although accurate when first written by a
projet's reporter, become inaccurate or misleading if they are not
carefully updated when the text of the law is revised during the
legislative process. These comments faithfully expound upon legal
rules that never became law. Comment (b) to Civil Code article 2545
is of this type. The article, which addresses the seller's liability for
redhibitory defects, provides that "[a] seller is deemed to know that
the thing he sells has a redhibitory defect when he is a manufacturer
of that thing." 29 6 The comment, however, provides that a manufacturer
is merely "presumed to know" of defects. 297 While this may seem like
a semantic trifle, the difference in language reflects an indefensible
mistake. Although early Law Institute drafts of the text of article
2545 provided that manufacturers were merely "presumed" to know
of redhibitory defects, the final version presented to the legislature
provided that the manufacturer's knowledge is "deemed." It thus
becomes clear that the comment's language, though deliberately
chosen, was never revised to reflect the text as enacted. Moreover, the
294.

Happily, Louisiana courts have recognized this error.

See Gorum v. Optimist

Club of Glenmora, 99-1963, p. 6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 8/30/00); 771 So. 2d 690, 694.
295. This is not the only instance of an entirely erroneous comment. Another error
that has been detected by the courts appears in the comments to Civil Code article 2534,
which provides the prescriptive periods applicable to actions for redhibition. LA. CIv. CODE
art. 2534. Comment (b) sets forth a contra-textual cap on the prescriptive period, citing Civil
Code article 3499 for the proposition that "an action in redhibition prescribes ten years from
the time of perfection of the contract regardless of whether the seller was in good or bad
faith." Id. art. 2534 cmt. b. This legal proposition is incorrect, as article 3499 states that the
prescriptive period for personal actions is ten years "[u]nless otherwise provided by
legislation." Id. art. 3499. Recent decisions have indicated an unwillingness to follow the
comment's directive. See, e.g., Mouton v. Generac Power Sys., Inc., 2014-350, p. 6 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 11/5/14); 152 So. 3d 985, 989-90 (determining that a buyer's reliance on
comment (b) to provide a prescriptive period for an action in redhibition was "misplaced").
Other decisions have evidenced some confusion over the issue. See, e.g., Tiger Bend, L.L.C.

v. Temple-Inland, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 686, 690 (M.D. La. 1999) (discussing the comment
and finding it to be "superfluous and unnecessary").
296. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2545.

297. Id. art. 2545 cmt. b.
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distinction is not one without a difference: while a presumption may
be rebutted, a fact that is deemed is not susceptible of refutation.
Although not entirely inaccurate, some comments may contain
vague or misleading information about the source of a new provision
of law. These obfuscations make it difficult for courts to draw upon
doctrinal materials relevant to the source provision for guidance in
interpretation. One noteworthy example is drawn from the law of
sales. Articles 2601 and 2602 of the Civil Code are well known as the
Louisiana analogues of UCC section 2-207.298 Indeed, the structure

and language of the articles is quite similar, though not identical, to
the UCC text.2 99 Although the comments to the new articles are
extensive, they reveal nothing of the undeniable influence of the
common law on the Louisiana provisions.300 The omission must have
been intentional and was presumably designed to prevent courts from
relying upon common law cases and doctrine analyzing the proper
application of the uniform law.
Another example of the comments obscuring the common law
origins of a revision, again drawn from the law of sales, is the revision
comment accompanying Civil Code article 2466. This comment
provides that the article, which sets forth a price gap-filing
mechanism for certain sales of movables, "gives legislative
formulation" to a rule established by a Louisiana case. 301 A brief
examination of the case and text exposes that the comment's
revelation is only half-true. In Benglis Sash & Door Co. v. Leonards,
the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a sale of windows despite the
parties' failure to expressly specify a price.302 According to the court,
in the absence of an express agreement, "the parties can consent to
buy and to sell a certain thing for a reasonable price, and when they
do, the contract of sale has been perfected." 303 With respect to the
facts at hand, the court noted that "[t]he parties had a history of
dealings in which [the buyer] ordered materials and paid the price

&

298. N. Stephan Kinsella, Smashing the Broken Mirror: The Battle ofthe Forms, UCC
2-207, and Louisiana's Improvements, 53 LA. L. REV. 1555, 1556 (1993) (noting that the
Louisiana articles present a 'new and improved' version of section 2-207").
299. Compare LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2601-2602, with U.C.C. § 2-207 (AM. LAW INST.
UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014).

300. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2601 cmts. a-i, 2602 cmts. a-b.
301. Id. art. 2466 cmt. ("[This article] gives legislative formulation to a rule
established by the Louisiana jurisprudence through an interpretation of [the source article] in
the light of the principles that govern consent in general.").
302. 387 So. 2d 1171, 1173 (La. 1980).
303. Id. at 1172-73.
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stated on the delivery invoice."304 Also, the buyer's specific conduct
suggested an implied understanding that a "reasonable price" would
be owed. 305 The codified rule, which supposedly finds its roots in this
case, provides a narrower and far less contextual exception to the
general rule. The general rule is that a price must be "fixed by the
parties in a sum either certain or determinable through a method
agreed by them."306 The exception provided by the text of article 2466
reads as follows:
When the thing sold is a movable of the kind that the seller habitually
sells and the parties said nothing about the price, or left it to be agreed
later and they fail to agree, the price is a reasonable price at the time
and place of delivery. If there is an exchange or a market for such
things, the quotations or price lists of the place of delivery or, in their
absence, those of the nearest market, are a basis for the determination of
a reasonable price.307
At first glance, the dissimilarity between case and text may be
dismissed as immaterial; after all, Benglis Sash stands for the general
proposition that the parties' consent to a price may be implied from
the circumstances.308 However, a quick comparison to the common
law's approach to this problem reveals that it is not Benglis Sash, but
rather the Uniform Commercial Code, that inspired the precise
language of the text. According to the relevant portions of the
uniform law:
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even
though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable
price at the time of delivery if (a) nothing is said as to price; or (b) the
price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree . . . .309
Thus, while it may be true that article 2466 is consistent with
Louisiana's jurisprudence, the text quite clearly parallels the common
law's formulation of this approach. Remarkably, the comment makes
no mention of the common law provision, which was undoubtedly a
source of the new law.
304. Id. at 1173.
305. Id. ("In the present transaction, moreover, [the buyer's] authorized agent ordered
a specific item which had to be specially ordered from the manufacturer. Although an exact
price was not immediately ascertainable, [the buyer] did not object to the price which was
eventually charged. Under these circumstances one could reasonably infer that [the buyer]
and plaintiff intended to buy and sell these particular windows at a reasonable price.").
306. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2464.
307. Id. art. 2466.
308. 387 So. 2dat 1173.
309. U.C.C. § 2-305 (2016).
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Whereas the comment accompanying Civil Code article 2466
obscures the law's relationship to foreign provisions, other comments
blur the relationship between a revised provision and prior law.
Consider, for example, the comment accompanying revised Civil
Code article 2012 and its description of the text. The article itself
addresses the court's power to modify stipulated damages, providing
that "[s]tipulated damages may not be modified by the court unless
they are so manifestly unreasonable as to be contrary to public
policy."310 The comment provides that the article "is new, but it does
not change the law."311 For this proposition, the comment cites a case:
Pennington v. Drews.312 However, in Pennington, the court refused to
enforce a stipulated damages clause, not because the damages were
manifestly unreasonable, but because the court interpreted Louisiana
law as requiring, like the common law, that proof of actual damage is
a prerequisite to recovery of stipulated damages.313 A careful analysis
of the jurisprudential history of stipulated damages reveals that the
text of article 2012 likely repudiates, rather than codifies, the result in
Pennington.314 That same analysis reveals also that pre-revision
jurisprudence was inconsistent in its approach to judicial modification
of the parties' agreement. 315 In its inexplicable endorsement of
Pennington, the revision comment represents both an error and a
missed opportunity-rather than declaring that the common law
approach has been abandoned, the comment recommits the text to the
uncertainty of pre-revision law.
The foregoing examples provide a sampling of the confusion
that may be wrought by comments as a result of inattentive drafting.
Another difficulty is that the comments, though beyond reproach
when drafted, may become corroded over time. This is because
comments, once published, are not systematically revised. Indeed,
any seasoned lawyer will have encountered in the comments
numerous consequences of the slow march of time. In some cases,
the legal principles articulated in the comments are no longer accurate
due to revision elsewhere in the law. Take, for example, comment (c)
to Civil Code article 518, which states:
310. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2012 (emphasis added).
311. Id. art. 2012 cmt.
312. Id. (citing Pennington v. Drews, 49 So. 2d 5 (La. 1949)).
313. 49 So. 2d at 10.
314. See SAlL LITVINoFF, 6 LOUISIANA CIvIL LAW TREATISE:
§ 13.6 (1999).
315. See id.
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[T]he ownership of movable property is transferred upon the consent of
the parties, and according to Article 2467 of the same Code, the risk of
loss is transferred to the buyer at that time. Thus, in Louisiana, the risk
is placed on the buyer at an earlier point in time than under the
U.C.C.316

While accurate at the time of publication, this comment now restates a
legal anachronism (resperit domino), which was discarded in 1995.317
Due to the sales revision effective that year, Civil Code article 2467
now provides, consistent with the common law, that the risk of loss of
the thing sold "is transferred from the seller to the buyer at the time of
delivery."318
With age also comes the risk that the comment will reference
provisions that have not been merely revised, but have instead been
eliminated. This is the case, for example, with the comments to Civil
Code article 517.319 Comment (b) refers the reader to article 2015 of
the Civil Code of 1870, which stated that "no one can transfer a
greater right than he himself has." 3 20 While the general principle of
article 2015 subsists as an undercurrent of many provisions, the article
itself was eliminated in the 1980s.3 2 1 The outdated cross-reference,
though unlikely to wreak havoc, brings less rather than more clarity to
the law.
Yet another consequence of time is that the comments, by
explaining that a prior institution is "eliminated" or "suppressed"
eventually refer to dinosaurs that only the most veteran attorneys
For example, the distinction between continuous and
recall.
discontinuous predial servitudes was entirely eliminated from
Louisiana law in 1977,322 a change that is confirmed in the comments
to Civil Code article 706.323 Presumably to explain the relationship
between the old and new law, the comments accompanying five

316. LA. CIV. CODE art. 518 cmt. c.
317. Act No. 841, 1993 La. Acts 2239; see also DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETr & DAVID

GRUNING, 24 LOUISIANA CivIL LAW TREATISE: SALES § 3:12 (2012) (noting that the principle
of resperitdomino was abandoned in the 1995 revision of the sales title).
318. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2467 (emphasis added).
319. See, e.g., id. art. 517 cmt. b.
320. Id. (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 2015 (1870)).
321. See 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE 610 tbl.1 (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed., Thomson
Reuters 2016).
322. AN. YIANNOPOULOS, 4 LOUISIANA CivIL LAW TREATISE: PREDIAL SERVITUDES

§ 1:16 (4th ed. 2013).
323. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 706 cmt. c (2017) ("The distinction of servitudes into
continuous and discontinuous has been suppressed in this revision.").
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additional provisions discuss the nuances of the prior distinction.324 In
the forty years following the revision, the need for lawyers to
appreciate the pre-revision law has declined considerably, as have the
utility of comments devoted to its exposition. Other dated comments
refer opaquely to the prior laws by number alone, without any
mention of the substance of suppressed or eliminated institutions.325
These comments themselves provide little meaningful help to the
practitioner or judge, and new lawyers may have no hope of
understanding the meaning of these comments without looking up
and spending considerable time studying the source provisions to
which they cite.326
A further source of frustration, if not futility, is the layering of
comments, stemming from the repeated revision of provisions over
time. With each new reform comes a new set of comments geared
toward explaining the updated rule. Understandably, the comments
must all be read together with an eye to determining which statements
in earlier comments, if any, are superseded by revisions in the law.
The layering usually occurs as a result of revisions to the same
provision; in such a case, the reader happily finds all relevant
comments in a single place.327 In some cases, however, the layering
occurs across multiple articles, with revised comments to one
provision referring to unrevised comments to another. Such is the
case with the law of parol evidence, where the 2012 revision comment
to article 1849 admonishes that the 1984 revision comments to article
1848 are no longer to be trusted.328 Undeniably, while the later324. See id. arts. 740 cmt. a, 741 cmt. a, 754 cmts. b-c, 759 cmts. b-c, 760 cmt.
325. See, e.g., id. art. 1853 cmt. e ("Civil Code Article 2290 (1870) has been
eliminated since the rule it contained lost its weight owing to jurisprudential developments.").
No information is given regarding the substance of the prior article, which has undoubtedly
been forgotten by most lawyers during the thirty-three years since article 1853 was revised.
326. Unfortunately, researching pre-revision law is no easy task, as the Code of 1870
is not widely available outside of law libraries, and Westlaw's "Historical Statutes" database
contains versions of the law dating only to 1987. See Louisiana Statutes AnnotatedHistorical, WESTLAw, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/StatutesCourtRules/Historical
Statutes/LouisianaStatutesAnnotatedHistorical (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
327. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 466 cmts. (1978). These comments are incomplete
given the 2008 revision of the article and its accompanying comments. See id. cmts. 2008.
The reader seeking further understanding of the text of article 466 must read both sets of
comments to gain a complete understanding of the law. Another example of comment
layering appears in the law of filiation, where article 196 is accompanied by three sets of
revision comments. See id. art. 196 cmts.
328. See, e.g., id. art. 1848 cmt. c. This comment states that "testimonial or other
evidence is admissible to prove an absolute or relative simulation." While this statement may
have been accurate at the time it was written, it is no longer correct. In 2012, article 1849
was enacted to provide that "a counterletter is required to prove that an act purporting to
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drafted comment seeks to bring clarity to the law, the failure of the
Law Institute to simply revise the comments as the law evolves
around them presents a hazard for all but the sharpest minds.
While errors, omissions, ambiguities, and anachronisms of
comments are significant, it is vital to caution that their drafters
should not be vilified. The comments are the product of a process
that is often quite starved for resources, both human and monetary.
Comments often must be drafted quickly, revised frequently prior to
finalization of a bill, and hastily reviewed as a projet winds its way
through the legislative process.
And without any formalized
mechanism in place for the post-enactment revision of comments, it is
hardly a surprise that the comments become stale and inaccurate over
time.
Nevertheless, the many and various shortcomings of the
comments must be documented, even highlighted. While individual
inaccuracies may be shrugged off as the consequence of human error,
taken together, the comments' substantive flaws reveal the need for
systematic attention. It is the practical utility of comments that
justifies their use. If practical utility is lacking, then the great
compromise of the comments (theoretical integrity for pragmatic
value) is called into question. Likewise, it cannot be forgotten that the
unofficial rank and status afforded to the comments is grounded
significantly on their presumed quality. If that quality turns out to be
exaggerated, then so too is their authoritative strength.
2.

Repercussions for the Law

A final, but substantial, functional critique is that the comments
may detract from the quality of the text itself. Relying on the
comments to expand or provide exceptions to legislative provisions,
drafters compose law that is necessarily incomplete. Consider again
the comments to Civil Code article 1837, which provide a rule
(counter to the text) that an act under private signature may be valid if
signed by one party alone.329

proposition

now

stated

in

At the time of the revision, the

the

comment

was

entirely

transfer immovable property is an absolute simulation." Id. art. 1849. Thus, contrary to
comment (c) of article 1848, testimonial evidence is not admissible in that case. While the
comments to article 1849 state that comment (c) to article 1848 "should no longer be
considered," no correction has been made in the now inaccurate comment itself Id. art. 1849
cmt. a.
329. Id. art. 1837 cmt. b; see also supra notes 236-239 and accompanying text
(discussing the conflict between article 1837 and its comment).
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uncontroversial.330 Indeed, the comment itself makes clear that the
enforceability of an act signed by one party alone is well accepted not
only in the Louisiana jurisprudence, but also in French law.331 Given
these circumstances, why then was the exception not codified in the
revision? What reason can justify the deliberate choice to relegate
this nuance of the law to a comment rather than giving it legislative
force?
One possibility is that the decision to opt for textual brevity is
the product of careful drafting. Keeping the aims of simplicity and
elegance top of mind, the drafter is required continually to choose
between a provision that, though sparse, is clear and concise, and
another that, through the incorporation of additional detail, risks
confusion or undue narrowing of the law. However, another
explanation for this overuse of comments is laziness in drafting.
Details that could be carefully incorporated into revised legislation are
too often relegated to comments as a matter of convenience. It is far
easier to define a rule by reference to its many past iterations than to
craft a general, enduring principle that encompasses those cases
without excessive generality. Additionally, it is far easier to gain
political consensus on a general legal tenet than on its various
permutations. When the wary legislator or Council member asks,
"but what about this?" and poses a counter-rule that undercuts the
drafted text, the response, "put it in a comment" often quells concerns
without the need for additional, tedious and possibly contentious
drafting.
The relegation of substantive rules to the comments-whatever
its motivation-comes at a great cost. Civil Code article 1837
provides a chief example of the tradeoff. The simple text of article
1837 belies the great complexity that surrounds the requirements of
formality. In truth, written consent in the form of a signature should
be required of all parties if the law imposes a form requirement for
reasons of solemnity (i.e., to impress upon the parties the magnitude
of the commitment they are making); but if the requirement is
evidentiary only, then other forms of proof may be allowed.332 Since
330. See Palmer, supra note 200, at 261-62.
331. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1837 cmt. b ("This exception is based on the same rationale as
the French doctrine of commencement de prevue par icrit (commencement of proof in
writing). Under that doctrine, a party who does not sign a writing under private signature is
nevertheless held to its terms if he has in any manner 'intellectually appropriated' those
terms.").
332. See LITVINOFF, supra note 314, §§ 12.12, 12.29.
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the act under private signature is generally required for evidentiary
purposes only, a party's signature to such an act should not be
required if that party has otherwise clearly manifested an intent to be
bound to the contract. 333 Ideally, the codified principle would clearly
state the rule, pointing to the distinction between proof and solemnity.
Unfortunately, neither the text nor the comments reveal the underlying
sense of the law. It is thus no surprise that the jurisprudence on the
requirement of signatures is largely undertheorized.
While the
comments provide a convenient means for addressing complexity,
they do harm when that complexity is unduly minimized.334
There is another possible reason why the comments often say
clearly what the law does not: comments provide a safety valve for
drafters to accomplish ends not attainable in the text. Comments may
permit drafters, whose initial proposal has been rejected by committee
or Council, to preserve the sense of the original, rejected draft.3 3 5 The
comments may thus allow a defeated proposition to endure, to the
detriment of both the political process and the clarity of the resulting
law.
A less treacherous but perhaps more salient risk is that
comments will be used to avoid commitments, whether political or
doctrinal. Consider again the drafter's configuration of the law and
comments surrounding undue influence in the law of donations. In its
simplicity, Civil Code article 1479 remains coy. What type and
magnitude of influence results in nullity of a donation? How does
one determine whether the volition of the donee has been substituted
for that of the donor?
These questions remain unanswered,
conveniently and, apparently, intentionally so. As comment (b)
candidly admits, "This Article intentionally does not use the word
'undue' to describe the influence (although the word is intentionally
used in the title of the Article and in two later Articles that refer to this
333. Id. § 12.29.
334. Examples of the Law Institute's reluctance to legislate nuanced but wellestablished and sensible exceptions to otherwise clear rules abound. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE
art. 1847 cmt. d (noting the jurisprudential rule that "a writing is not required to prove a
promise to pay the debt of a third person when the promisor had a material interest in making
the promise and has received something in return therefor," despite the article's clear
admonition that "[p]arol evidence is inadmissible to establish . . a promise to pay the debt of
a third person"); id. art. 3467 cmt. d (noting that the jurisprudential doctrine of contra non
valentum "continues to be relevant" despite the article's clear statement that "[p]rescription
runs against all persons unless exception is established by legislation").
335. See JAMES J. WmITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 13-14 (5th ed. 2000) (citing Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial

Code?, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779, 782 (1953)).
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Article)."336 Does this omission and the attendant relegation of the
common law "rules" to the comments signal that lawmakers were
reluctant to commit to the common law framework for undue
influence, or even the very idea of a legal transplant? If deliberate, the
decision was a costly one. Without certainty that the legislature
intended to fully embrace the American doctrine of undue influence,
courts are quite reasonably reluctant to rely upon common law
sources to interpret and apply the law.337
V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND FURTHER STUDY

The aim of this Article has been to initiate a conversation about
the comments-their status, their role, their philosophical and
practical weaknesses, and their potential utility as a source of
guidance for judges and practitioners. This conversation has just
begun, and a great deal more research and discussion about the
comments is required; it would therefore be inappropriate for this
Article to set forth a definitive list of solutions for the challenges that
comments pose. Nevertheless, some initial observations may be made.
First, the comments are here to stay. The tradition of drafting
and publishing comments alongside the law is seventy-five years in
the making. Attempting to put an abrupt halt to the use of comments
would not only be futile, it would be disruptive, as judges and lawyers
have grown used to the idea that comments are a valuable source of
information about the law. Thus, the conversation surrounding
comments should focus predominantly on the ways in which their
flaws can be minimized and their quality improved.
Second, while the conventional wisdom that the comments are
not law accurately states the formal status of comments, it masks their
informal significance. While a change to the comments' formal status
is neither appropriate nor desirable, the rhetoric surrounding the
comments should be adapted to reflect the complexity of the
comments' informal stature. In the courtroom, in the classroom, and
in scholarly writing, jurists calling upon the comments should
336.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479 cmt. b.

337. At least one Louisiana trial court has looked to common law cases for guidance
in construing article 1479. See, e.g., In re Succession of Reeves, 97-20, p. 9 (La. App. 3 Cir.
10/29/97); 704 So. 2d 252, 257-58 (discussing the trial court's reliance on a four-part test to
establish undue influence derived from common law jurisprudence). However, this approach
has not been the prevailing one. That said, it is not altogether clear that the comments are
responsible for courts' reluctance to utilize common law authorities in their application of the
article.

2017]

HIDDENLAW

335

acknowledge their quasi-legislative and de facto force. Overt
recognition of the comments' special status will, it is hoped, stimulate
increased debate about the comments, clarify courts' thinking about
their utility, and motivate lawmakers to insist upon their improvement.
Third, given the instrumentality of the comments in the
edification of the legislature, bench, and bar, and in the outcome of
legal disputes, it is undeniable that comments must be carefully
drafted, unquestionably accurate, and free of political agenda. Thus
far, the Law Institute and legislature have taken great care, while using
limited resources, to ensure that highly trained legal experts craft the
comments, subject to collective review and approval, and revise them
for accuracy prior to the publication of the law. Any deficiencies in
this process or its ultimate product that have been identified in this
Article are wholly forgivable given that the work of the Law Institute
is accomplished almost entirely through the efforts of volunteers who
dedicate, without compensation, their labor and energy to the mission
of law reform. However, more can and should be done to ensure the
quality of comments.
At present, standards for the drafting of comments are lacking;
indeed, the content and style of comments is currently left nearly
entirely to the discretion of individual reporters. 338 Oversight to
ensure accuracy and quality, though present, is minimal. The addition
of a specialized committee of the Law Institute tasked not only with
review and coordination of comments, but also the development of
guidelines for their drafting, would be a step in the right direction for
the comments' improvement.339 This body, once appointed, should
also consider whether recommendations should be made to the
legislature regarding the revision and publication of comments. These
recommendations will require careful deliberation and further study.
The revision of comments during the legislative process may increase
their quality, but would come at the cost of increased politicization.
Similarly, while the publication of final, revised comments on the
legislature's website would increase their visibility, it may unduly
increase the perception of legislative endorsement.
Fourth, comments must be judiciously maintained over time.
The comments historically have been regarded as a static resource,
338.
339.

See supra PartI.B.L.
These guidelines might make recommendations regarding the length and content

of comments, standards for the citation of cases and provision of examples, and rules
regarding cross-references, all with an eye to enhancing the utility of comments and ensuring

that they neither directly contradict the text nor quickly become outdated.
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providing information about the relationship between revised law and
prior law at the moment of the revised law's enactment. But the
comments, once published, endure. To prevent comments from
becoming stale or inaccurate over time, comments must be regarded
as a living source of law.340 Admittedly, the task of updating and
maintaining comments is staggering and would require the efforts of
more than the members of a single committee. Luckily, specialized
bodies capable of performing this task are already in place, as the Law
Institute has dozens of standing committees tasked with the
continuous revision of numerous areas of the law. Those standing
committees that have become defunct over time can be revived, and
additional standing committees appointed as necessary. 341
le all
of this labor may require more resources, the importance of revising
comments cannot be understated. Continual cultivation of the
comments will not only ensure that most errors and inconsistencies
are eliminated, it will undoubtedly lead to insights about ways in
which the legislative text can be improved. Continual revision of the
comments has another advantage as well: post-enactment revision
reduces the quasi-legislative force of comments, bringing them more
into the realm of traditional doctrine, while also increasing their
intellectual weight and practical utility.
Fifth, the character of comments as a form of legal doctrine must
be both emphasized and scrutinized. As a source of legal doctrine,
comments are designed to provide guidance regarding the law's
proper interpretation. However, comments serve another, more
340. The Law Institute's legislative mandate is broad enough to include the authority,
if not the duty, to continually revise commentary in order to ensure that it does not become
anachronistic over time. See LA. REv. STAT. § 24:204(A)(l)-(2), (5), (7) (2017) ("[I]t shall be
the duty of the Louisiana State Law Institute .... To consider needed improvements in both
substantive and adjective law and to make recommendations concerning the same to the
legislature ....
To examine and study the civil law of Louisiana and the Louisiana
jurisprudence and statutes of the state with a view of discovering defects and inequities and
of recommending needed reforms .... To recommend from time to time such changes in the
law as it deems necessary to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and
to bring the law of the state, both civil and criminal, into harmony with modem conditions
... . [T]o provide by studies and other doctrinal writings, materials for the better
understanding of the civil law of Louisiana and the philosophy upon which it is based.").
341. The Law Institute's website differentiates between active and non-active
committees as many of its committees ceased meeting long ago. Committees, supra note 69.
For example, the Leases (Book III) Committee is inactive, but recent research and reform
work concerning leases has been undertaken by a new, ad hoc committee: the LandlordTenant Committee. The Sales Committee stopped meeting after the 1995 revision of the law
of sales but was revived to revise the law of exchange. To the extent possible, comments
should be revised by standing committees having broad authority over an entire field
(Property, Sales, Family Law, Leases, etc.).
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specialized role as well: they are a form of advocacy, designed to
convince the legislature of the wisdom of proposed law reforms.
Thought should be given to whether those two functions are at odds
with one another and whether the latter is more properly
accomplished by the traditional exposd des motifs or other scholarly
writing. Moreover, as a form of doctrine, comments are uniquely
hamstrung. The temporal and physical proximity of comments to the
legislative text and their relationship to the legislative intent militate
against crafting comments that expressly criticize the logic or policy
of legislative rules. Instead, the responsibility to vigorously critique
both the law and the comments falls to other forms of doctrine. While
it may seem unnecessary to point out that it is the job of legal scholars
to critique and thereby advance the law, Louisiana's rich tradition of
legal scholarship has evolved over the last several decades, and today,
fewer Louisiana scholars are actively writing on Louisiana law (as
opposed to national, international, or comparative law).342 Moreover,
as time passes following a revision, thoughtful legal scholarship
should expose evolutions in the law and social mores that point away
from the comments' utility.343 With more "doctrinal nourishment"

from which to draw, courts will be less reliant on the comments, and
this will necessarily and appropriately diminish their de facto force.344
Finally, a robust scholarly debate regarding the philosophical,
methodological, and practical issues surrounding the drafting and use
of comments must be undertaken. The discourse to date has focused
almost entirely on the conflict between comments and the ideals of
codification. The drafting and use of comments raises many other
questions that have yet to be explored by scholars in this state. In
conducting an exhaustive analysis, scholars must engage in
342. As evidence of this, the Louisiana Law Review's tradition of having local
scholars regularly comment upon legislative and jurisprudential developments has declined
in recent years. See Board of Editors, Foreword: Recent Developments and Ruminations in

Retrospect, 70 LA. L. REV. 1099, 1099-1104 (2010). And, while Thomson Reuter's Louisiana
Treatise Series contains numerous excellent volumes, they are limited in their number and
scope. For example, there is little to no systematic coverage in that series of the family law,
the law of contract formation, lease law, or the law of registry.
343. See Cueto-Rua, supra note 266, at 171 ("The references to judicial precedents in
the comments of the recent Revision are suggestions to the bench and bar. These comments

provide specific instances of the individualized meaning of general rules of the law; they
assist the interpreter. They indicate a way, yet they are not binding. They may be accepted

and followed if they are good solutions for the conflicts awaiting judicial resolution. They
probably will not be accepted if new social mores, unexpected events, or changes of attitudes
and values make it convenient to seek new normative meanings.").
344. See Panel Discussion, supra note 131, at 74.
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comparative study.
Louisiana lawmakers can draw upon the
experiences of other jurisdictions in the civil law and common law
traditions, both to inform their thinking about the challenges posed by
comments and to provide solutions to those challenges. Any steps
that Louisiana lawmakers take to ameliorate the problems of
legislative comments will necessarily be an example to other
jurisdictions struggling to sensibly draft, update, and manage the use
of comments. 345
VI. CONCLUSION

Over a half century ago, scholars writing about the revision of
the Louisiana Civil Code cautioned against embarking upon the
monumental task of law reform without an adequate and detailed plan
for drafting legislation.346 Understandably, the focus at the time was
on the text. Nonetheless, the admonition is no less applicable to the
comments. For too long, the use and making of comments has
continued without thoughtful consideration. While the challenges
posed by the comments hardly create a crisis of legal methodology,
they do raise important questions about the making and application of
our law and the principles that underlie those processes. Recognition
of the comments' significance is long overdue.
This Article has sought to begin a discussion about the
comments, their import, and their flaws. As the first attempt at
meaningful scrutiny of the issues, it undoubtedly provides an
incomplete account of the comments' significance. Nevertheless,
besides initiating a discourse about the comments, describing the
process by which they are made, and exploring their rank and status
as a source of law, this Article presents a framework for future
examination of the comments: while the publication and use of
comments can have great practical value, they come at a cost to the
values underpinning our legal system. Future evaluations of the
comments and the processes by which they are made, as well as
suggestions for their improvement must be made with this calculus in
mind.
Achieving the proper balance is vital both to the
methodological integrity and to the quality of our law.
345. For example, although the Uniform Law Commission drafts extensive
commentary to accompany its uniform laws, its drafting guidelines make no mention of
standards for the preparation of comments. See UNIF. LAW COMM'N, DRAFTING RULES (2012
ed.).
346. See, e.g., Clarence J. Morrow, CurrentProspectsfor Revision of the Louisiana
Civil Code, 33 TUL. L. REv. 143, 146 (1958).
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